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Abstract 
We use a threshold-based design to study ex post discretion in lenders’ contractual enforcement 
of covenant violations. At preset thresholds, lenders enforce contractual breaches only 
infrequently, but this enforcement is associated with material consequences, e.g., fees and 
renegotiations. Enforcement varies significantly over time and peaks when credit conditions are 
tightest, indicating that enforcement is procyclical. Costly coordination reduces enforcement: 
syndicates with ex ante restrictive voting requirements enforce at lower rates. Consistent with 
theories of lender competition and implicit contracting, enforcement rates are lower for 
borrowers with access to alternative sources of financing and well-reputed lead arrangers. 
I. Introduction 
Restrictive financial covenants are an important feature of private loan contracts (Bradley 
and Roberts (2015)). These covenants are written on a multitude of financial ratios and 
amounts and they include preset thresholds that, if breached, provide lenders with the right to 
accelerate the loan (Aghion and Bolton (1992), Roberts and Sufi (2009b)). This state-contingent 
transfer of control rights, known as a covenant violation, is typically resolved when borrowers in 
breach of the contract either agree to pay a waiver fee, agree to increase the spread on the 
balance of the loan maturity, or renegotiate the loan altogether (Freudenberg, Imbierowicz, 
Saunders and Steffen (2017)). The overall cost of a covenant violation for a firm includes not 
only the direct waiver fees and spread increases, but also any fallout with respect to 
equityholders’ views on resultant changes in corporate policies (Chava and Roberts (2008), Nini, 
2 
 
Smith, and Sufi (2009), Roberts and Sufi (2009a), Nini, Smith, and Sufi (2012), Falato and 
Liang (2016)).1 Corporate managers themselves acknowledge the cost of covenant violations and 
they report making significant efforts to avoid breaching covenant thresholds (Graham, Harvey, 
and Rajgopal (2005)). 
In this paper, we introduce and investigate a novel feature of loan contracting; namely, the 
fact that lenders use ex post discretion in their enforcement of restrictive financial covenants. 
Although contractual breaches provide lenders the right to accelerate the loan and extract 
material benefits from borrowers, we find that lenders only infrequently enforce contractual 
breaches.2 This laxity suggests that lenders forbear from enforcement on borrowers who are in 
contractual breach, and raises questions about why lenders do not act in all cases. We provide 
several novel findings regarding the determinants of lender enforcement behavior around 
contractual thresholds as well as the costs of this behavior from the perspective of lenders.  
Estimating contractual enforcement presents several empirical challenges. Contractual 
breaches are typically unobservable to the econometrician, and even in settings in which 
contractual enforcement is observable, selection on counterparty quality is a concern. We solve 
these problems by exploiting restrictive financial covenants in loan contracts as a setting in 
which breaches are observable to the econometrician and contractual thresholds vary with 
                                        
1 Ex post estimates of the cost of covenant violations range from 2.5% to 3.5% of firm value (Beneish and Press (1993)), 
and ex ante estimates that account for anticipation, renegotiation, and selection on leverage are even larger (Denis and 
Wang (2014), Roberts (2015), Glover (2016), Ertan and Karolyi (2017)). 
2This result is consistent with practitioners’ long-held perspective on covenant breach enforcement as documented in 
Zinbarg (1975): “My own institution's experience may serve as an illustration. … In no more than about five per cent 
of these cases will we refuse the request or even require any quid pro quo. . .” (p. 35). 
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counterparty quality. This allows us to account for counterparty quality when estimating 
enforcement rates. We observe ex ante covenant thresholds (i.e., the minimum or maximum 
value an underlying financial ratio or amount can take without breaching the contract) and the 
underlying financial ratios or amounts at all future dates. Therefore, we can calculate the 
distance to covenant thresholds through the duration of each contract. This allows us to 
implement a threshold-based empirical design for a panel of loan packages that estimates 
differences in enforcement propensities for borrowers whose financial ratios or amounts fall just 
above or just below their preset thresholds. Our most restrictive specification holds fixed both 
time-varying borrower quality at the industry level as well as time-invariant characteristics of 
the borrower-lender pair, including those that lead them to endogenously match. Our preferred 
specification suggests that lenders enforce covenant breaches 11% of the time. 
We recognize that our baseline estimates are susceptible to measurement error because 
covenant slack—following the loan initiation, in particular—is measured with noise due to 
renegotiations, non-GAAP definitions, and dynamic covenant thresholds. Because of these 
issues, our focus in the paper is primarily on the existence, determinants, and costs of 
forbearance, rather than its exact magnitude. Nonetheless, we conduct several additional tests to 
investigate potential biases due to measurement error. These tests demonstrate that our primary 
findings are unlikely to be explained by measurement error. For example, our results hold in 
subsamples of loans that include only covenant types that are not modified, those that do not 
have dynamic thresholds, or those that are not renegotiated before maturity. To validate our 
measure of enforcement, we collect data on two salient enforcement outcomes: the payment of 
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waiver or amendment fees and renegotiation.3 These fees are similar in magnitude to the other 
important fees documented in Berg, Saunders, and Steffen (2016). In univariate tests, we find 
that the likelihood of these two enforcement outcomes are 2.0 and 4.6 times higher, respectively, 
when a borrower has a contemporaneous violation. We confirm that this univariate relationship 
holds in a multivariate setting and around covenant thresholds. These findings suggest that the 
choice to forbear is associated with real costs for lenders in the form of foregone fees and 
renegotiations. 
We complement our discontinuity evidence with an investigation of the dynamics of lender 
forbearance. Consistent with Freudenberg, Imbierowicz, Saunders, and Steffen (2017), we find 
that contracting dynamics over the course of a loan have a significant influence on enforcement 
rates. Lenders are more likely to enforce when borrowers simultaneously breach multiple 
covenants and lenders’ enforcement behavior toward a given borrower tends to be consistent 
over time. Lenders are more likely to enforce a covenant if they recently enforced another 
breach, but they are less likely to enforce a covenant if they recently exhibited forbearance 
toward that borrower. 
Using this threshold-based design, we find that enforcement rates vary significantly over 
time. Within the time frame of our sample, average enforcement rates range from 5% to 18% 
and these rates peak when credit conditions are tightest, suggesting that enforcement 
                                        
3 We measure renegotiations using the refinancing indicator in Dealscan and by identifying subsequent loans that have 
similar terms and are of the same type issued by the same borrower-lead arranger pair before the maturity. Following 
Roberts and Sufi (2009a), we collect data on fees paid by borrowers for covenant violation waivers and term amendments 
from 8-K filings. 
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exacerbates credit cycles. This contrasts with the low rate of enforcement overall, which would 
otherwise suggest that long-term loans mitigate the rollover risk typically associated with short-
term debt. Moreover, we find that lenders are less likely to enforce contractual breaches for 
loans that have initially strict covenant packages. This is also consistent with explicit ex ante 
contracting and implicit ex post contractual enforcement being behavioral complements. It 
further suggests that empirical measures of ex ante contract strictness should be adjusted for the 
likelihood of ex post forbearance (Murfin (2012), Demerjian and Owens (2016)).   
We also find that cross-lender coordination costs reduce enforcement. We construct several 
proxies for coordination costs, including syndication status and, conditional on syndication, the 
size and concentration of the syndicate, the lead arranger’s retained share, and the number of 
participating institutional investors. Our preferred measure of coordination costs is the 
minimum number of lenders required to pass an enforcement action, calculated using the 
distribution of loan shares across syndicate participants and using the predetermined 
contractual voting rules, typically following majority or supermajority conventions. Syndicates 
with more restrictive voting requirements are 4.0 percentage points less likely to enforce a 
breach.  
Additionally, we investigate cross-sectional determinants of forbearance on both the 
borrower and lender sides. Lenders are less likely to enforce the contractual breaches of 
borrowers who have easy access to alternative sources of funds, suggesting that bargaining 
power determines equilibrium enforcement. However, lenders are more likely to enforce contracts 
with relationship borrowers, consistent with the literature on hold-up. Lead arrangers with high 
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reputation, as measured by their league table ranking, are less likely to enforce breaches, 
consistent with low reputation lenders lacking ex ante commitment to avoid opportunistic 
enforcement. These results further suggest that optimal enforcement depends on endogenous 
matching in the loan market.  
Our work contributes to the bank lending literature on lender control and monitoring as 
well as to the applied microeconomics literature on bilateral contracting with imperfect 
information and the potential for renegotiation. The lender control literature has documented 
several consequences of covenant violations for borrowers, including investment (Chava and 
Roberts (2008)), debt issuance (Roberts and Sufi (2009a)), executive compensation and 
corporate governance (Nini et al. (2012)), and employment (Falato and Liang (2016)). To this 
literature, we contribute evidence of when and how, from a contracting perspective, the 
economic consequences of covenant breaches for borrowers arise in equilibrium.  
The two closest papers to ours are Bird, Ertan, Karolyi, and Ruchti (2018) and Chodorow-
Reich and Falato (2018), both of which study bank-level variation in covenant enforcement. 
Whereas Bird et al. (2018) focus exclusively on lender opportunism stemming from pressure to 
meet short-term performance benchmarks, Chodorow-Reich and Falato (2018) study 
enforcement as a function of bank solvency only during the financial crisis. Both studies 
complement ours in that they provide additional evidence that bank-level incentives affect 
enforcement decisions in specific states of the world.  
Our findings that lenders tend to forbear from enforcement have significant implications for 
our understanding of lender behavior, and they suggest the need to reinterpret previously 
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documented effects. In particular, because prior studies do not explicitly model the transition 
from a covenant breach to an enforcement action, they either mix the effects of enforced and 
unenforced covenant breaches or conflate the effects of enforcement selection with potential 
endogenous responses to forbearance. Because our enforcement rate estimates are significantly 
less than 100%, they suggest that prior studies focusing on the effects of breaches may 
understate the effects of enforcement but overstate the frequency of enforcement since they 
attribute the effects of a few instances of material enforcement to many breaches. However, 
because borrowers may risk-shift or take preventive actions in response to lender forbearance, 
we cannot sign the estimation bias implications of our estimates for prior work that studies the 
effects of material covenant violations. Overall, the prevalence of lender forbearance suggests 
that future research should consider the enforcement decision. 
To the growing literature on bank monitoring, we provide novel evidence of ex post 
discretion in contractual enforcement as well as a series of cross-sectional findings that show 
how enforcement heterogeneity is determined by syndicate structure and voting rules, lender 
reputation, and borrower access to alternative funding sources. Our direct evidence of lender 
enforcement complements recent evidence on the frequency with which lenders acquire 
information using borrower data requests (Gustafson, Ivanov, and Meisenzahl (2018)) or process 
information using updates to internal ratings (Plosser and Santos (2016)). Banks acquire and 
process new borrower information and we show that they use this information to select which 
contractual breaches to to respond to. Together, our work complements the extant literature 
that studies bank monitoring using ex ante characteristics of loan syndicates and covenant 
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packages (Lee and Mullineaux (2004), Sufi (2007), Sufi (2009), Wang and Xia (2014), Becker 
and Ivashina (2016)). 
II. Data and Measurement   
The data for our investigation come from two main sources: quarterly firm financials from 
Standard & Poor’s Compustat and loan-level information from Thomson Reuters’ DealScan. To 
link these data sources, we use Michael Roberts’ link table to match DealScan borrowers to 
Compustat and we use Aytekin Ertan’s link table to match DealScan lead lenders to 
Compustat. Finally, we obtain data on material covenant violations from the websites of Amir 
Sufi and Michael Roberts, and we complement these with data on amendment and waiver fees 
that we collect from 8-K filings. Our main estimation sample covers the period from 1996 to 
2008, since data on material covenant violations are available only for this period and exclude 
borrowers from the financial and utilities sectors.4 After the linking procedure, we obtain a 
sample of 5,171 distinct loan packages that cover 2,762 borrowers and 410 lenders. These loans 
comprise, on average, one-third of the dollar value of the syndicated loan portfolios for banks in 
our sample.  
Our main sample is constructed at the loan package-quarter level in order to follow loans 
over time. We use package-level rather than tranche-level or borrower-level observations because 
covenants are defined at the package level and because a single borrower may have more than 
                                        
4 These sectors have two-digit SIC codes between 60 and 69, and between 44 and 50, respectively. 
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one loan outstanding across multiple lenders in a given period.  We use the stated start and end 
dates to convert packages into package-quarters.5 We then match each loan package to 
Compustat and obtain the borrower financial statement information necessary to calculate 
covenant slack for each quarter. Variables are defined in Appendix A. Table 1 reports summary 
statistics for lenders, borrower, and loans.  
We calculate the slack for firm i’s jth covenant in quarter t as 
(1)                                            SLACK_MIN𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 =
𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖−𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
𝜎𝜎𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
  
for minimum covenants, such as a minimum interest coverage ratio, or 
(2)                                            SLACK_MAX𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 =
𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖−𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
𝜎𝜎𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
  
in the case of maximum covenants, such as a maximum debt-to-EBITDA ratio. In each of these 
equations, the variable u denotes the underlying financial ratio or amount, while u (ū) is the 
relevant threshold in the case of a minimum (maximum) covenant, and σ is the volatility of the 
underlying u, measured over the previous eight quarters for that firm.6 We code firm-quarter 
SLACK as the minimum across the standardized values for each covenant for that package-
quarter. The indicator variable NEGATIVE_SLACK is equal to one in firm-quarters in which 
SLACK_MIN or SLACK_MAX is less than zero. The indicator variable VIOLATION is equal 
to one for package-quarters that include a material covenant violation, as identified in the data 
from Roberts and Sufi (2009a) and Nini et al. (2012). Note that borrowers are required to 
disclose material covenant violations as part of SEC rules. Specifically, the rules for “General 
                                        
5 We define package maturity as the stated maturity date of the largest tranche. 
6 Specific covenant threshold calculations are in Appendix B and are similar to those in Demerjian and Owens (2016). 
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Notes to Financial Statements” (17 CFR 210.4-08) require borrowers to disclose not only 
breaches of covenant thresholds that exist at the time the filing is made (e.g. in an 8-K, 10-K, or 
10-Q), but also breaches that have been cured at the time of filing, such as through a waiver or 
an amendment, if these are associated with material consequences, such as fees or changes in 
loan terms. In Appendix C, we present two sets of examples of borrower disclosures surrounding 
covenant breaches and violations. 
III. Contractual Enforcement Around Covenant Thresholds 
The lead arranger of a syndicated loan is the primary point of contact for the borrower. As 
a result, the lead arranger is known as the delegated monitor, which is responsible for engaging 
with the borrower regularly for its own benefit and that of its syndicate participants. These 
engagements are generally known as monitoring, and they typically include coordinating 
payments and ensuring compliance with contractual terms. Assessing the borrower’s conformity 
to restrictive financial covenants is among the most frequent of these engagements (Gustafson et 
al. (2018)).  
In their role as delegated monitor, lead arrangers have two avenues for influencing the 
resolution of contractual breaches. First, the lead arranger has discretion over whether to notify 
syndicate participants about breaches discovered while monitoring the borrower. This could take 
the form of actively waiving breaches that all parties observe, passively failing to detect a 
breach, or passively failing to report a detected breach to participants. Second, conditional on 
the lead arranger reporting the contractual breach to the lending syndicate, the syndicate must 
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vote on whether to accelerate the loan, which could require refinancing, renegotiation, or 
payment default, but is typically resolved with a waiver (Gopalakrishnan and Parkash (1995), 
Dichev and Skinner (2002)). Lead arrangers can exercise voting power in accordance with their 
retained share and the voting rule adopted by the lending syndicate. Thus, in resolving 
contractual breaches, lead arrangers have discretion over the intensity of their detection 
technology and, conditional on detection, the punishment for the breach (Lee and Mullineaux 
(2004)).7  
III.A.   Main Results 
We begin our analysis with two motivating observations that demonstrate that lenders use 
ex post discretion in contractual enforcement. First, Figure 1 shows nonparametric evidence 
that lenders increase contractual enforcement to about 10% at borrowers’ preset covenant 
thresholds. Statistically, this evidence suggests that optimal enforcement is not trivially zero or 
one, and this implies that lenders use discretion in enforcement. This is consistent with the 
anecdotal notion that some contractual breaches are important and others are not—the latter 
are commonly known as “foot-faults.” Second, Figure 1 also shows nonparametric evidence that 
lenders are more likely to enforce the most severe breaches. This suggests that lenders use ex 
post discretion to enforce contracts in the most severe cases first, which could be due to noisy 
                                        
7 For covenant waivers, simple majority or super majority voting rules apply. As lead arrangers typically retain between 
one-quarter and one-half of the loan amount, they have a proportionally large voting stake in technical default 
proceedings. 
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detection technologies, the costs of renegotiation or resolution, or enforcement selection based on 
borrower quality. 
This motivating evidence suggests that lenders use ex post discretion in contractual 
enforcement. However, some unobservable characteristics of lenders or borrowers might explain 
these observations. For a more formal treatment of such issues, we turn to a threshold-based 
design that incorporates increasingly restrictive fixed effects to isolate alternative sources of 
identifying variation (Jiang (2015)). Our baseline regression model is 
(3)                 VIOLATIONit = a + b1NEGATIVE_SLACKit + f(SLACKit) + eijt 
in which VIOLATIONit is an indicator that equals one if borrower i discloses a material 
covenant violation in quarter t, and zero otherwise, NEGATIVE_SLACK is an indicator that 
equals one if the borrower is in breach of at least one covenant, and zero otherwise, and f() is a 
polynomial control function of SLACK, the standardized distance to covenant thresholds, which 
is allowed to differ for positive and negative values of SLACK. We present estimates of this 
model in Table 2.  
Our preferred specifications in Table 2 use global polynomial control functions. From 
column to column, the estimates in Table 2 correspond to an increasingly restrictive set of fixed 
effects, which isolate and eliminate various confounding explanations for the baseline result. In 
Column (1), we present baseline estimates that include no fixed effects.8 This shows that lenders 
enforce contractual breaches at a rate of 10.7% in the neighborhood of preset covenant 
                                        
8 We cluster standard errors at the borrower level, but the results are generally robust to clustering at other levels, 
including two-way clustering by lead bank and borrower.  
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thresholds. This effect is statistically different from zero. Perhaps more interestingly, it is also 
statistically smaller than one, consistent with lax enforcement. 
Columns (2)–(4) include industry and year-quarter fixed effects, industry by year-quarter 
pair fixed effects, and industry by year-quarter pair and lender fixed effects, respectively. All 
these columns present estimates in the 9–10% range. These findings suggest that unobservable 
trends in industry performance or loan contracting do not explain variation in contractual 
enforcement. The estimates in Column (4), which incrementally incorporate lender fixed effects, 
show that accounting for fixed differences across lenders does not affect our estimates. 
Column (5) incrementally incorporates borrower fixed effects to estimate lender 
enforcement behavior using variation in VIOLATION and SLACK for the same borrower over 
time, and Column (6) adds lender-borrower pair fixed effects to control for any characteristics 
that lead lenders and borrowers to initially match in the loan market. Estimates in Columns (5) 
and (6) are quantitatively similar to each other, but they are economically smaller than those in 
the first four columns, indicating that fixed borrower characteristics explain some of the 
variation in enforcement. This might arise if lenders forbear enforcement for a subset of 
borrowers that are frequently in breach of contract. The estimates in Columns (5) and (6) are 
both approximately 6% and statistically different from both zero and one. 
III.B.   Specification Robustness 
We complement the discontinuity estimates from Table 2 with a battery of robustness tests 
to illustrate that our findings are not sensitive to functional form choices or bandwidth 
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restrictions (Van der Klaauw (2008), Lee and Lemieux (2010)). In Columns (1) and (2) of Table 
3, we vary the order of the polynomials in f(). In Column (1), we estimate a 10.5% enforcement 
rate with no polynomial controls for SLACK, while in Column (2) we estimate a 9.1% 
enforcement rate with quadratic forms. In Columns (3) and (4), we restrict the bandwidth to 
within two and five standardized units of SLACK and we estimate enforcement rates of 7.1% 
and 8.5%, respectively. Columns (5) and (6) add linear polynomial control functions to the 
specifications in Columns (3) and (4) with bandwidth restrictions, and these estimate 
enforcement rates of 4.2% and 5.3%, respectively. In all cases, these estimates are statistically 
larger than zero and smaller than one. In Appendix D, we show that we again obtain similar 
estimates when we use optimally selected bandwidths (Calonico, Cattaneo, and Titiunik (2014), 
(2015)).9 
As an alternative robustness check, we conduct placebo tests to examine changes in lender 
enforcement around placebo covenant slack thresholds. We present the results of these tests in 
Figure 2. Specifically, in Panel A of Figure 2, we investigate six placebo thresholds at SLACK = 
{-3, -2, -1, 1, 2, 3} as well as the corresponding estimate for the true threshold of SLACK = 0. 
These estimates correspond to our main specification presented in Column (1) of Table 2, 
though they are restricted to a bandwidth of one unit of SLACK, which allows us to avoid the 
support of SLACK crossing the true covenant threshold in each placebo test. In Panel B, we 
repeat the placebo test analysis for 800 placebo thresholds in the SLACK ranges [-5, -1] and [1, 
                                        
9 We also check our main results for a much smaller bandwidth and for specifications that use an Epanechnikov kernel 
with optimal bin sizes and bandwidth. 
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5] and we present the t-statistics for each placebo discontinuity. The t-statistic underlying our 
preferred estimate is well above and outside the distribution of these placebo t-statistics. 
Altogether, these tests show no discontinuity in enforcement around placebo covenant 
thresholds. 
III.C.   Measurement Robustness 
In this subsection, we discuss and explicitly address the potential for measurement error in 
our main variables of interest; SLACK, NEGATIVE_SLACK, and VIOLATION. We first note 
that we are interested in both whether enforcement rates are bounded away from zero and from 
one. In order to bias our estimates, the source of measurement error must be systematically 
correlated with both the disclosure of a material covenant violation in SEC filings as well as the 
underlying financial ratios and amounts we calculate using Compustat. Because we have used a 
restrictive set of fixed effects to isolate variation within the lender-borrower pair and within the 
borrower’s industry in each year, such a systematic correlation cannot be an empirical artefact 
of the behavior of one lender, borrower, or lending relationship, and cannot be the artefact of 
the time-varying economic conditions of the borrower’s industry. Therefore, our primary 
concerns about measurement error relate to unobserved lender actions (i.e., cases in which the 
lender uses control rights without a corresponding disclosure of a material covenant violation) 
and to unobserved contract-specific modifications to covenant definitions (i.e., SLACK reveals a 
breach, but the modified definition would not).  
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One such concern is the possibility of renegotiation to expunge breaches before they would 
have to be disclosed (Denis and Wang (2014)). As discussed earlier, the SEC’s disclosure rules 
require covenant violations to be reported even in cases in which the violation has been waived, 
as long as the violation was accompanied by any material consequences for the borrower, 
including fees paid or terms amended. In the cases in which a renegotiation preempts a covenant 
violation, if lenders had used control rights to extract any material benefits then these benefits 
would be required to be disclosed. Nevertheless, we explicitly investigate the effect of 
renegotiations on our estimates of enforcement rates in supplemental tests discussed below.  
Measurement error may arise due to three features of loan contracting and covenant 
definitions that vary over time at the loan level. These features include contract-specific 
modified covenant definitions, loan renegotiations, and dynamic thresholds. In Table 4, we 
estimate four specifications that explicitly address these potential sources of error.  
Columns (1) and (2) focus on measurement error that stems from our calculation of SLACK 
using standard covenant definitions. Not all covenants have universally standard definitions, 
and the lack of data and loan-specific references to covenant ratios and amounts makes 
interpreting modifications a challenge (Dichev and Skinner (2002), Zhang (2008), Demerjian and 
Owens (2016)). This means that our calculation of financial ratios and amounts governed by 
covenants using Compustat may generate measurement error in covenant slack at initiation.  
Fortunately, to deal with this source of measurement error, we are aided by the existence of 
four covenant types that have standard definitions; quick ratio, current ratio, net worth, and 
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tangible net worth (Chava and Roberts (2008), Demiroglu and James (2010)).10 In Column (1), 
we re-define NEGATIVE_SLACK as an indicator that equals one for observations that have 
negative SLACK only when one of these covenant types without modifications is breached, and 
zero otherwise. This ensures that our estimates of enforcement rates depend only on breaches 
that we measure without error. When we eliminate this source of measurement error in this 
specification, we estimate an enforcement rate of 10.5%. Similarly, in Column (2), we estimate 
enforcement rates using only the subsample of loans that have covenants without modifications. 
This decreases our sample size by over 95%, and therefore reduces the statistical power of our 
tests, but we continue to estimate a statistically significant enforcement rate of 13.4%. The 
results in Columns (1) and (2) are both economically larger than our preferred specification in 
Table 2. This suggests that, as we expected, the measurement error from covenant modifications 
is attenuating our estimates of enforcement rates. 
Our measures based on covenant slack (i.e., NEGATIVE_SLACK and SLACK) may also 
suffer from measurement error over time because covenant thresholds may vary over time due 
to dynamic threshold terms or loan renegotiations. Column (3) of Table 4 provides similar 
estimates of lenders’ enforcement rates for a sample that consists only of loans without 
renegotiations (i.e., those whose covenants have not been amended). This sample minimizes the 
potential misclassification of borrowers into breach and no breach groups because some 
borrowers renegotiated their loan contracts in anticipation of a violation. In Column (4), we 
                                        
10 10,576 of 31,927 breaches are for no-modification covenants. 
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similarly eliminate all loan packages that have covenants with dynamic threshold terms. Our 
enforcement rate estimates in Columns (3) and (4) are in the 10–12% range, demonstrating that 
these time-varying sources of measurement error do not impact our inferences.  
Finally, we note that, although resolving these three sources of measurement error does 
increase the magnitude of our coefficient estimates, the quantitative implications of our 
estimates are unchanged. Importantly, in no cases are our enforcement rate estimates 
statistically close to the upper bound of 100% or the lower bound of 0%. This implies that 
lenders use discretion in ex post enforcement. Further, this result is consistent with Figure 1, 
which shows that enforcement rates fail to exceed 25% even for severe breaches. It also raises 
questions about how and when lenders choose to enforce contractual breaches.  
III.D.   Dynamics of Lender Forbearance 
In this section, we provide complementary evidence on how enforcement depends on breach 
severity as well as past contracting experiences. First, we test whether lenders are more likely to 
enforce covenants when the borrower has breached more than one financial covenant. To do 
this, we interact NEGATIVE_SLACK with MULTIPLE_BREACHES, which is an indicator 
that equals one if borrower i is in breach of more than one financial covenant in quarter t, and 
zero otherwise. In Column (1) of Table 5, we present evidence that lenders are twice as likely to 
exhibit enforcement for borrowers who have simultaneously breached multiple covenants, 
consistent with the notion that lender enforcement depends on breach severity.  
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In Columns (2) and (3), we explore the extent to which contracting dynamics affect 
enforcement rates. Column (2) interacts NEGATIVE_SLACK with PRIOR_VIOLATION, an 
indicator that equals one if borrower i previously disclosed a material covenant violation in the 
past year, and zero otherwise. The positive and significant coefficient in Column (2) shows that 
lenders are more likely to enforce breaches when the borrower has had a recent violation. To 
study whether forbearance behavior is also persistent, we interact NEGATIVE_SLACK with 
PRIOR_FORBEARANCE, an indicator that equals one if borrower i breached at least one 
covenant of the loan package in the previous year but did not disclose a corresponding material 
covenant violation, and zero otherwise. Column (3) shows that lenders who chose not to enforce 
a recent breach are about 20 percentage points less likely than other lenders to punish a breach 
in the future.   
IV. Determinants of Lender Forbearance 
IV.A.   Credit Conditions 
Credit cycles have important macroeconomic effects on output and asset prices (Bernanke 
and Gertler (1989), Kiyotaki and Moore (1997)). The apparent procyclicality of credit supply 
affects firm-level financing and investment policies (Ivashina and Scharfstein (2010), Becker and 
Ivashina (2014)). Moreover, access to long-term debt insulates borrowers from transient shocks 
to credit supply (Almeida, Campello, Laranjeira, and Weisbenner (2012)). However, the 
frequency of contractual breaches and the ability of lenders to exert control may expose long-
term debt issuers to credit cyclicality and thus expose them to the corresponding effects on 
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financing and investment choices. If enforcement rates increase when credit is scarce, then 
lenders’ ex post discretion exacerbates the effects of credit cycles. But if enforcement rates 
decrease when credit is scarce, then lenders’ ex post discretion mitigates credit cycle risk for 
existing borrowers. 
We test this relation using four measures of credit conditions. First, we use data from a 
Federal Reserve survey to measure TIGHT_CREDIT, an indicator that equals one if the 
standardized net proportion of senior loan officers who report tightening credit standards 
exceeds its median value, and zero otherwise. Figure 3 shows a strong positive correlation over 
time between enforcement and TIGHT_CREDIT. Second, we use RECESSION, an indicator 
variable that identifies year-quarters during NBER recessions. Third, we construct 
HIGH_PCT_BREACH, an indicator that equals one if the contemporaneous fraction of loans 
in the lead arranger’s portfolio that are in breach of at least one covenant threshold exceeds its 
median value, and zero otherwise. Fourth, we construct HIGH_PCT_BREACH_INDUSTRY, 
an indicator that equals one if the contemporaneous fraction of loans in the borrower’s industry 
that are in breach of at least one covenant threshold exceeds its median value, and zero 
otherwise. Although our objective is not to decompose demand and supply channels, we 
associate our findings regarding TIGHT_CREDIT and HIGH_PCT_BREACH with supply 
channels and we associate HIGH_PCT_BREACH_INDUSTRY with demand channels.  The 
Federal Reserve’s survey asks respondents about credit standards, which implies funding 
decisions conditional on borrower demand, and the proportion of each lender’s loan portfolio in 
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breach is lender specific. However, industry downturns should cause industry trends in covenant 
breaches.  
Table 6 presents results that demonstrate the relationship between credit conditions and 
enforcement rates, which we estimate using the same threshold-based design that was 
implemented in previous sections. In each column, we interact NEGATIVE_SLACK with one of 
our measures of credit conditions. The coefficient of interest is on the interaction term and this 
can be interpreted as the incremental amount of enforcement associated with variation in credit 
conditions. Column (1) interacts TIGHT_CREDIT with NEGATIVE_SLACK and the SLACK 
polynomial control functions. The estimate of 5.5% suggests that periods with tightening credit 
standards are associated with 5.5 percentage points higher enforcement rates. Similarly, Column 
(2) suggests that enforcement rates are 3.7 percentage points higher during NBER recessions. 
The estimate in Column (3) suggests that when a high proportion of the lead arranger’s loan 
portfolio is in breach, enforcement rates increase by 3.9 percentage points. Similarly, Column (4) 
suggests that when a high proportion of loans in the borrower’s industry are in breach, 
enforcement rates increase by 2.4 percentage points. In all cases, the coefficient on 
NEGATIVE_SLACK is between 7.9% and 9.8%, suggesting that while enforcement rates vary 
significantly with credit conditions, they remain statistically different from both zero and one at 
the peaks as well as the troughs of credit cycles.  
IV.B.   Coordination Costs 
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In this section, we investigate cross-sectional enforcement heterogeneity based on syndicate 
characteristics commonly associated with ex ante monitoring intensity, coordination costs, and 
disagreement. The difficulty in coordination across multiple lenders is an important friction that 
potentially hinders efficient renegotiation, particularly in the case of default (Gertner and 
Scharfstein (1991), Bolton and Scharfstein (1996)). Whether the loan is syndicated or sole-led 
changes the average level of asymmetric information between borrowers and lenders, so it should 
also affect the propensity of the lending syndicate to enforce contractual breaches. The 
enforcement of contractual breaches may also be affected by syndicate structure if syndicate 
participants are at an informational disadvantage in technical default resolution. We capture 
coordination costs using syndicate size and concentration. In fact, this sort of subgame play is 
important for understanding equilibrium syndicate structure (Lee and Mullineaux (2004), Sufi 
(2007)).  
Finally, dispersion in beliefs, or disagreement, among creditors is likely increasing in the 
number of lenders (Van den Steen (2010), Billett, Elkamhi, Popov, and Pungaliya (2016)). 
Therefore, a salient measure of the cost of coordination is the minimum number of lenders 
required to pass a vote to resolve a covenant breach, which we measure using ex ante loan 
shares and the required lenders voting convention. This required lenders voting convention is 
preset by the syndicate, and it typically assumes majority or supermajority forms. We also 
investigate the role of institutional investors because previous literature has documented their 
recent rise in syndicate participation and their influence on loan contracting (Becker and 
Ivashina (2016)).  
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Table 7 presents results that document the importance of enforcement heterogeneity 
according to lender monitoring incentives, coordination costs, and the likelihood of 
disagreement. Again, we estimate this heterogeneity using the threshold-based design as 
implemented in previous sections. In each column, we interact NEGATIVE_SLACK with one of 
our measures of monitoring incentives, coordination, or disagreement. The coefficient of interest 
is on the interaction term, and it can be interpreted as the incremental amount of enforcement 
associated with this source of heterogeneity. Column (1) interacts SYNDICATION with 
NEGATIVE_SLACK and the SLACK polynomial control functions. The estimate of -3.0% 
suggests that contractual breaches of syndicated loans are 3.0 percentage points less likely to be 
enforced than breaches of sole-led loans. Columns (2) and (3) present estimates consistent with 
coordination costs reducing enforcement. The estimate in Column (2) indicates that, on average, 
large syndicates (i.e., those with an above-median number of participants) have 3.2 percentage 
points lower enforcement rates. The estimate in Column (3) suggests that dispersed syndicates, 
those with below-median syndicate concentration (i.e., HHI of the ex ante loan shares), have 4.1 
percentage point lower enforcement rates. All these results are consistent with the theoretical 
literature on coordination (e.g. Gertner and Scharfstein (1991)), in which the probability of 
coordination decreases as the number of pivotal agents increases. 
We measure information asymmetries between the borrower and lenders using the lead 
arranger’s retained share of the loan (Sufi (2007)). The estimate in Column (4) suggests that 
loans with a below-median retained share have 4.4 percentage point lower enforcement rates. 
Column (5) estimates that loans with at least one institutional investor participant have 3.9 
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percentage point higher enforcement rates, consistent with the prior evidence that institutional 
investors prioritize immediate earnings (Bushee (2001)). Lastly, we find that, on average, 
increasing the minimum number of lenders in order to pass an enforcement vote reduces 
enforcement rates. This suggests that coordination costs constrain the ability to enforce 
contractual breaches. Overall, our results are consistent with coordination costs affecting 
forbearance. 
IV.C.   Bargaining and Lender Hold-up 
In this section, we investigate the role of bargaining power and loan market competition in 
determining lender enforcement rates. Informational frictions can increase the cost of finding a 
new lender, leading to a form of hold-up in which the relationship lender increases spreads 
(Greenbaum, Kanatas, and Venezia (1989), Sharpe (1990), Rajan (1992)). Furthermore, the 
intensity of this friction depends on the amount of soft information collected by the existing 
lender as well as the borrower’s access to alternative funding sources, either in the loan market, 
the bond market, or elsewhere (Schenone (2010), Bird, Karolyi, and Ruchti (2019)).  
We construct five measures that capture these notions of bargaining power and hold-up. 
The first is RELATIONSHIP, an indicator that equals one if the borrower and lender have 
transacted in the past, and zero otherwise. The next is MULTIPLE_LEADS, an indicator that 
equals one if the borrower has contemporaneously borrowed from multiple lead arrangers, and 
zero otherwise. The indicator BOND_ACCESS equals one if the borrower has public bonds 
outstanding and zero otherwise. The indicator LOW_WHITED_WU equals one if the 
25 
 
standardized Whited-Wu (2006) index of financial constraints is below its median value, and 
zero otherwise. Last, LARGE is an indicator that equals one if the borrower’s total assets 
exceed the median total assets, and zero otherwise.  
The estimate shown in Column (1) of Table 8 suggests that relationship borrowers face 6.5 
percentage points higher enforcement rates than transactional borrowers, consistent with lender 
hold-up. The estimates in Columns (2) and (3) indicate that borrowers with cheap alternative 
funding sources in the private loan market and public bond market face 1.9 and 9.0 percentage 
points lower enforcement rates, respectively. This is consistent with the theoretical arguments in 
Diamond (1991) and Rajan (1992)—borrowers have more bargaining power with their lenders 
when they have strong outside options, in the form of cheap access to alternative financing 
opportunities. In Column (4), our estimate suggests that borrowers with higher financial 
constraints are 8.6 percentage points more likely to face enforcement. Enforcement is more likely 
for worse borrowers, as measured either by covenant slack or financial constraints. Lastly, the 
estimates in Column (5) suggest that large borrowers face 13.1 percentage points lower 
enforcement rates, on average. Across each of these measures, we consistently find that 
enforcement rates are increasing in information frictions and decreasing in the borrower’s ability 
to access alternative funding sources. In this sense, our results are consistent with those of 
Schenone (2010). Borrowers benefit from better outside options not just ex ante, in the explicit 
terms of the loan, but also over the course of the loan, due to more lenient enforcement by 
lenders in the case of covenant breaches. 
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IV.D.   Implicit Contracting and Reputation 
Are implicit and explicit contracting substitutes or complements? Restrictive covenants 
provide an ideal setting to investigate this question in the private loan market because 
contractual thresholds are explicitly set ex ante, but lenders have implicit discretion to enforce 
contractual breaches ex post. In Table 9, we investigate cross-sectional enforcement 
heterogeneity based on ex ante explicit contracting. In particular, we focus on the ex ante 
strictness of covenant sets, which we measure in two ways at the beginning of each loan. First, 
we use INITIAL_SLACK, which is the loan package’s minimum standardized distance to 
covenant thresholds. Next, we use INITIAL_STRICTNESS, a calibrated measure of the 
probability of technical default as in Murfin (2012).  
If implicit and explicit contracting are used as substitutes, we expect higher enforcement 
rates when initial contract strictness is low. This is exactly what we find across all three 
measures. In Column (1), we find that borrowers with above-median values of initial covenant 
slack have 3.4 percentage points lower enforcement rates. Similarly, in Column (3), we find that 
borrowers with above-median values of initial contract strictness have 3.6 percentage points 
lower enforcement rates. Since implicit contracting may vary especially with borrower-lender 
pairs via endogenous matching in the loan market, we include estimates with borrower-by-lender 
fixed effects in Columns (2) and (4). The interaction coefficient estimates decrease in magnitude 
by approximately one-third, but they remain statistically and economically significant. This 
suggests that the substitution between ex ante explicit contracting and ex post enforcement 
varies within lending relationships.  
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These findings are particularly striking because selection on unobservable borrower quality 
should bias our results toward finding that implicit and explicit contracting are complements. 
This is because low-quality borrowers, who are likely to subsequently face higher enforcement 
rates, should only be able to negotiate contracts that are strict ex ante. While we do find that 
implicit and explicit contracting are substitutes, the theoretical literature on implicit contracting 
suggests that implicit contracting is infeasible in a one-shot game in the absence of commitment. 
However, it appears that lenders can solve this commitment problem to some degree through a 
repeated games mechanism, such as reputation (Klein and Leffler (1981), Sharpe (1990)).  
We next investigate the role that lender reputation may play in the use of implicit 
contracting. In Table 10, we use two measures of lender reputation based on market-wide and 
industry-specific league table rankings to investigate cross-sectional enforcement heterogeneity 
with reputation. These league tables are based on annual deal volume, and anecdotally, they 
have sizable effects on lender choice and bargaining.11 As in our previous tables, we estimate this 
heterogeneity using the same threshold-based design as implemented in previous sections.  
Columns (1) and (2) interact NEGATIVE_SLACK with TOP_10, an indicator that equals 
one if the lead arranger is ranked in the top ten in market-wide league tables, and zero 
otherwise. Columns (3) and (4) instead use the natural log of league table rank. Our estimates 
using each of these measures suggest that high reputation lenders have lower enforcement rates; 
top-ranked lenders enforce 2.5 percentage points less frequently and, similarly, a 100% increase 
                                        
11 The dominant provider of loan information for market participants, Loan Pricing Corporation, suggests that its 
primary role is to construct league tables: https://www.loanpricing.com/products/loanconnectordealscan/.  
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in rank (i.e., a decrease in reputation) is associated with a 1.0 percentage point increase in 
enforcement rates. Like the implicit contracting results in Table 10, we include borrower-by-
lender fixed effects in Columns (2) and (4). We find robust evidence that the effect of lender 
reputation varies within lending relationships. Overall, our results in Tables 9 and 10 are 
consistent with theories of implicit contracting. We find that implicit and explicit contracting 
are substitutes in the private loan market, and that well-reputed lenders enforce contractual 
breaches at lower rates. 
IV.E.   Borrower Slack Manipulation 
Dichev and Skinner (2002) show that an unusually small number of loan-quarters exhibit 
accounting ratios falling just below covenant thresholds, and an unusually large number fall just 
above. They interpret this as evidence that firms actively manage key accounting variables to 
avoid tripping a covenant. This is certainly a concern, for example, in studies of the real effects 
of covenant breaches since that literature relies on comparing subsequent investment (or other 
outcomes) for firms that just breached versus those that barely did not. For example, if the 
firms that just avoided a breach did so by reducing investment (i.e. by manipulating), then this 
change in the control group could contaminate estimates of the causal effect of the breach on 
investment. 
Since our goal in this paper is to study the endogenous choice to enforce, the threshold of 
zero covenant slack serves only as a measurement tool. For this reason, we do not require any 
assumptions about the exogeneity of covenant slack. Nonetheless, the incidence of manipulation 
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may affect the interpretation of our findings on the determinants of forbearance. Most 
importantly, lenders’ expectations about manipulation by borrowers may be an important 
determinant of their enforcement behavior, though the sign of this effect is not clear a priori. 
The prediction depends on how lenders, cognizant of potential manipulation, view borrowers 
who just breach their covenants. On the one hand, breaching may be a strong negative signal if 
it suggests that the borrower was unable to avoid the breach even after manipulating. On the 
other hand, it may be a positive signal if the lender infers that this borrower can be trusted 
because they did not manipulate even though they could have. This ambiguity means that the 
relationship between manipulation and forbearance is an empirical question. 
In Figure 4, we investigate whether manipulation is itself a determinant of forbearance and 
whether our existing findings on determinants could themselves be explained by cross-sectional 
variation in manipulation. The top panel of the figure shows McCrary (2008) plots for the 
borrower covenant slack distribution after splitting loans into two groups: a high enforcement 
sample and a low enforcement sample. These groups are determined according to our findings on 
the determinants of forbearance as described in the above subsections. If a characteristic is 
associated with high enforcement (i.e. it has a positive coefficient in Tables 5-10), then the loans 
with that characteristic are allocated to the high enforcement sample. After this sorting is 
completed, we find two slack distributions that are very similar in appearance. Both groups 
show significant evidence of manipulation, but the McCrary (2008) test statistics in the two 
distributions are statistically indistinguishable. We thus conclude that borrower slack 
manipulation is not itself a first-order determinant of lender forbearance, nor does the possibility 
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of such manipulation provide an alternative explanation for the evidence on determinants we 
present above.12 
In regard to the interpretation of our results on the determinants of forbearance, one may 
question the representativeness of the pool of borrowers who breach, and are thus subject to 
enforcement. We investigate this concern by comparing other observable characteristics of 
borrowers and loans on either side of the covenant thresholds. This analysis, which we present 
in Figure 5, shows that the pool of borrowers subject to enforcement is representative of 
borrowers that just did not breach. 
As a final test, we investigate the presence of manipulation across covenant types with the 
idea that some financial metrics may be more difficult or more costly to manipulate. We find no 
evidence of manipulation for a subset of covenants: debt/equity, leverage, cash interest 
coverage, debt service coverage, EBITDA, quick ratio, current ratio, and net worth. In 
Appendix Table D12, we re-estimate the specifications from Table 2 using a new definition of 
SLACK based only on these manipulation-free covenants. Our estimates on the propensity to 
enforce covenant breaches are quantitatively similar to our baseline findings. This finding 
corroborates our inference that manipulation is not a first-order determinant of enforcement 
decisions. 
V. How Costly is Lender Forbearance? 
                                        
12 Separately, we add controls to our main specification from Table 2, particularly including total and discretionary 
accruals to account for borrower manipulation behavior. The results are presented in Appendix Table D11 and are 
economically and statistically similar to our baseline findings. 
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In order to understand the significance and implications of lender forbearance, it is 
important to understand the cost of this behavior. That is, what benefit is the lender actually 
giving up by not enforcing covenant breaches? Contract enforcement can have a variety of 
outcomes, including a formal letter to the borrower, a waiver fee, renegotiation of the loan 
terms, refinancing, or loan acceleration. Among these, fees and renegotiations are common.  
As a first step, we wish to examine whether the fees paid when lenders enforce  are 
economically meaningful in the context of other fees that borrowers pay to lenders. To do so, we 
follow Berg et al. (2016) in comparing amendment and waiver fees to upfront fees, commitment 
fees, annual fees, and utilization fees.13 Figure 6 presents histograms of the distributions of each 
of these different types of fees, conditional on observing them in the data. The figure shows that 
waiver fees, averaging 32 basis points, are of a similar magnitude to these other important fees, 
and they follow similar distributions. This descriptive evidence suggests that understanding the 
behavior of these new fees (and thus the actual cost of lender forbearance) is quantitatively 
important. 
In combination with data on loan renegotiations from DealScan, our data on fees can also 
be used to validate the connection between our measure of enforcement (i.e., disclosures 
concerning material covenant violations) and real contracting outcomes. Thus, our first check on 
the validity of VIOLATION is to correlate it with propensities for fee payment and 
renegotiation. In our data, we find that the propensity of firms paying a fee is 4.6 times higher if 
                                        
13 Since the distinction between waiver and amendment fees is often unclear from the text alone, we classify the fees we 
collect as waiver fees if the borrower discloses a contemporaneous violation, and as amendment fees otherwise. 
32 
 
the firm has a contemporaneous violation. Further, the propensity of a firm renegotiating its 
loan is 2.0 times higher if the firm has a contemporaneous violation, despite the fact that 
renegotiations often take place outside of covenant breach (Denis and Wang (2014)). These two 
univariate comparisons suggest that our measure of enforcement is tightly linked to 
economically meaningful outcomes for borrowers. 
To verify that this univariate relationship is not being driven by borrower quality, we 
also estimate the relationship between indicators that identify fee payment or renegotiations and 
VIOLATION. These tests allow us to control for borrower quality using polynomials of SLACK 
as well as restrictive fixed effects that net out time-varying economic conditions at the borrower 
industry level. Columns (1) and (3) of Table 11 present estimates of these tests for fee payments 
and renegotiations, respectively. In both cases, we find an economically large, positive 
relationship between VIOLATION and these enforcement outcomes.14  
Because our threshold-based design identifies forbearance at the covenant threshold, we 
check whether the relationship between VIOLATION and these enforcement outcomes holds 
locally in this region. We do this using the following fuzzy regression discontinuity design: 
(4)          ENFORCEMENT_OUTCOMEit = a + b1VIOLATION𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖�  + g(SLACKit) + eijt 
(5)                 VIOLATIONit = a + b1NEGATIVE_SLACKit + f(SLACKit) + eijt. 
Since the first stage of this specification is exactly the same as the one presented in 
Equation (3), the identifying variation in the second stage for VIOLATION comes from just 
                                        
14 In the case of fees, we include both waiver and amendment fees as defined above. This means that the increased 
incidence of fees we document is over and above the baseline likelihood of fee payment due to loan amendments, which 
can occur whether or not the loan is in breach. 
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around the covenant threshold. Columns (2) and (4) of Table 11 present second-stage estimates 
of Equation (4) for fee payment and renegotiation, respectively. These estimates confirm that 
Violation is strongly associated with these real contracting outcomes at the threshold that 
determines whether lenders have control rights.  
In Section IV we showed how different characteristics of borrowers, loans, and lenders 
are associated with differences in enforcement; this can be thought of as the extensive margin of 
enforcement or forbearance. Using our data on fees, we can extend these findings with some 
preliminary evidence on the intensive margin. That is, we ask whether the same kinds of 
characteristics that predict a high probability of enforcement are also associated with stronger 
enforcement as measured by the level of fees. In Figure 7, we show that this is indeed the case. 
When we split loans into high- and low-enforcement subsamples, following the same procedure 
as in Section IV.E., we find that the mean waiver fee for the high-enforcement sample is 
statistically significantly greater than for the low-enforcement sample. We believe that this 
difference is broadly consistent with the theories described in Section IV, and it also provides 
corroborating evidence underscoring the importance of the determinants of forbearance we 
study. 
VI. Conclusion 
In this paper, we study the contractual enforcement of restrictive financial covenants. We 
find that lenders exercise significant ex post discretion. Breaching these covenants gives the 
lenders substantial power, including the right to accelerate the loan or extract benefits, in the 
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form of fees or improved terms, from the borrower. However, our baseline finding is that lenders 
choose to enforce contractual breaches only 11% of the time. This result suggests that lender 
forbearance is an economically significant feature of loan contracting. We provide several novel 
findings concerning variation in this behavior over time as well as across borrowers and lenders, 
and we show how this novel contracting margin interacts with explicit contractual terms. 
Enforcement is more likely when credit conditions are otherwise tight and when coordination 
costs among lenders are high, but enforcement is less likely when lenders have strong 
reputations and when borrowers have better external financing options. 
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Appendix A: Variable Definitions 
Variable Name Definition 
VIOLATION One for material violation that the borrower discloses in an SEC filing. 
SLACK 
Distance to covenant threshold divided by trailing volatility of the covenant 
variable. Minimum of these values is used for loans with multiple covenants. 
FEE One for waiver or amendment fee that the borrower discloses in an 8-K filing. 
AMENDMENT One if the amendment flag in DealScan indicates that the loan is amended. 
NEGATIVE_SLACK Indicator that equals one if SLACK < 0, zero otherwise. 
STRICTNESS Measure of the probability of technical default as in Murfin (2012). 
SPREAD Weighted average spread in basis points. 
AMOUNT Loan package amount in millions of dollars. 
MATURITY Weighted average maturity in months. 
SECURED Indicator that equals one for collateral. 
MULTIPLE_BREACHES 
Indicator that equals one if the borrower is in breach of more than one 
financial covenant in the quarter 
PRIOR_VIOLATION 
Indicator that equals one if the borrower previously disclosed a material 
covenant violation in the past year 
PRIOR_FORBEARANCE 
Indicator that equals one if the borrower breached at least one covenant of the 
loan package in the previous year but did not disclose a corresponding material 
covenant violation 
CREDIT_TIGHTENING Standardized net % loan officers reporting a tightening of credit standards. 
RECESSION Indicator that equals one during an NBER recession, and zero otherwise. 
PORTFOLIO_NEGATIVE_SLACK % of loans in the lead arranger’s portfolio that are in breach of a covenant. 
INDUSTRY_NEGATIVE_SLACK % of loans in the borrower’s industry that are in breach of a covenant. 
SYNDICATION Indicator that equals one if the distribution method is syndication. 
NUM_LENDERS Index of syndicate size based on the number of lenders in the syndicate. 
LENDER_HHI Sum of squared loan shares among syndicate participants. 
RETAINED_SHARE Fraction of the loan retained by the lead arranger. 
NUM_INSTITUTIONS Number of institutional investors in the lending syndicate. 
LENDERS_TO_PASS 
The smallest number of lenders required to vote for a covenant waiver based 
on initial loan shares and contractual voting rules. 
RELATIONSHIP 
Indicator that equals one if the lead arranger has initiated at least one loan 
with the borrower previously. 
MULTIPLE_LEADS 
Indicator that equals one if the borrower has outstanding loans with at least 
two distinct lead arrangers simultaneously. 
BOND_ACCESS Indicator that equals one if the borrower has an S&P credit rating. 
WHITED_WU 
Standardized Whited-Wu index, for which higher values correspond to a higher 
cost of external financing. 
SIZEl Slack Initial Slack Standardized total assets of the borrower in millions of dollars. 
INITIAL_SLACK 
Minimum standardized distance to covenant thresholds across covenant types 
in the initial loan package. 
INITIAL_STRICTNESS Measure of initial contract strictness from Murfin (2012). 
TOP_10 
Indicator that equals one if the lead arranger is among the top ten ranked 
underwriters by deal volume in the quarter. 
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lnLEAGUE_RANK Log of the lead arranger’s rank by deal volume in the quarter. 
 
 
Appendix B: Covenant Calculations 
Covenant Name Calculation (Compustat codes) 
    
Debt-to-EBITDA (Dlcq + Dlttq) / Rolling EBITDA 
Debt-to-Equity (Dlcq + Dlttq) / Seqq 
Debt-to-Tangible NW (Dlcq + Dlttq) / (Atq – Intanq – Ltq) 
Leverage (Dlcq + Dlttq) / Atq 
Current ratio Actq/Lctq 
Quick ratio (Rectq + Cheq) / Lctq 
Cash interest coverage Rolling EBITDA/Rolling interest paid 
Interest coverage Rolling EBITDA/Rolling interest expense 
Debt service coverage Rolling EBITDA/(Rolling interest expense and principal payment) 
Fixed charge coverage 
Rolling EBITDA/(Rolling interest expense, principal payment, and 
rent payment) 
Net worth Atq – Ltq 
Tangible net worth Atq – Intanq – Ltq 
EBITDA Rolling EBITDA 
    
Rolling EBITDA, interest expense, interest paid, and principal paid are calculated using the sum 
of the firm’s past four quarters.  
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Appendix C: Covenant Enforcement Examples 
Example #1: 
Enservco Corp was in violation of its fixed charge coverage ratio as of the end of the third 
quarter of 2017, but was able to negotiate a waiver of the breach with its lender in exchange for 
a $20,000 fee. 
From 10-Q filed November 14, 2017: 
As of September 30, 2017, we were in violation of a loan covenant under the New Credit 
Facility that requires our Fixed Charge Coverage Ratio (as defined in the 2017 Credit 
Agreement) (“FCCR”) to be not less than 1.10 to 1.00 at the end of each month, with a 
build up beginning with January 1, 2017. Our FCCR as of September 30, 2017, was 0.62, 
calculated in accordance with the 2017 Credit Agreement, and constituted an Event of 
Default, as defined in the 2017 Credit Agreement. East West Bank may, at its election, 
declare all our obligations under the New Credit Facility immediately due and payable 
and cease advancing money or extending credit to us, among other remedies. We are 
currently in negotiations with East West Bank regarding a waiver of the testing of this 
covenant until December 31, 2017 through an amendment to the 2017 Credit 
Agreement, which would remedy the covenant violation. However, as of November 14, 
2017, we had not finalized an amendment and we therefore classified borrowings under 
the New Credit Facility ($23,543,802) as a current liability in the accompanying 
condensed consolidated balance sheet as of September 30, 2017, resulting in us having a 
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significant working capital deficit of approximately $21.1 million. We cannot provide 
assurance that we will reach an agreement regarding the waiver, however, we believe it 
is probable that such an agreement will be reached. If East West Bank exercises its 
option to declare our borrowings under the 2017 Credit Agreement immediately due and 
payable, or cease advancing money or extending credit to us, our ability to continue as a 
going concern will be negatively affected. 
Then a week later (November 21, 2017), Enservco filed an 8-K: 
On November 20, 2017, Enservco Corporation (the “Company”) entered into a First 
Amendment and Waiver (the “Amendment and Waiver”) with respect to the Company's 
existing Loan and Security Agreement (the “2017 Credit Agreement”), dated November 
20, 2017, by and among the Company and East West Bank, A California Banking 
Corporation (“East West Bank”).   
Pursuant to the Amendment and Waiver, East West Bank waived an event of default 
with respect to the Company’s failure to satisfy the minimum fixed charge coverage ratio 
set forth in the 2017 Credit Agreement for the reporting period ended September 30, 
2017, and permitted the Company to forego testing of its fixed charge coverage ratio as 
of October 31, 2017 and November 30, 2017. In connection with the Amendment and 
Waiver, the Company agreed to pay East West Bank an amendment fee in the amount 
of $20,000. 
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Example #2 
Yuma Energy, Inc. was in violation of its maximum debt to EBITDA covenant and secured a 
waiver from its lenders in exchange for a reduction of the borrowing base under the credit 
agreement, extra financial disclosures, and the reimbursement of some lender costs. 
From 10-K filed March 30, 2016: 
On December 30, 2015, we entered into the Waiver, Borrowing Base Redetermination 
and Ninth Amendment (the “Amendment”) to our Credit Agreement (the “credit 
agreement”) with Société Générale (the “Bank”) as administrative agent and issuing 
bank, and each of the lenders and guarantors party thereto. Pursuant to the 
Amendment, the borrowing base under the credit agreement was reduced from $35.0 
million to $29.8 million and will automatically be reduced to $20.0 million on May 31, 
2016 unless otherwise reduced by or to a different amount by the lenders under the 
credit agreement. The Amendment also provided a waiver of the financial covenant 
related to the maximum permitted ratio of funded debt to EBITDA for the fiscal quarter 
ended September 30, 2015 and any failure to comply with that financial covenant and 
certain other financial covenants for the fiscal quarter ended December 31, 2015.  
 
40 
 
From an 8-K filed January 5, 2016, we can see the contractual language of the amendment, 
including the reduction in borrowing base described above, and an agreement by the borrower 
to provide extra financial disclosures to the lenders and reimburse the lenders for various fees. 
On (i) Thursday of each week (commencing January 7, 2016), an update to the 
Borrower and its Subsidiaries’ 13-week cash flow forecast delivered with respect to the 
immediately preceding week, including actual performance for the prior week and 
variance reports, and (ii) the last Business Day of each month (commencing 
December 31, 2015), a report of the outstanding accounts payable of the Borrower and 
its Subsidiaries (including an aging report) as of the end of the immediately prior month, 
in each case, in reasonable detail and otherwise in form and substance acceptable to the 
Administrative Agent.” 
The Administrative Agent shall have received from the Borrower (a) payment of all out-
of-pocket fees and expenses (including reasonable attorneys’ fees and expenses) incurred 
by the Administrative Agent in connection with the preparation, negotiation and 
execution of this Waiver and Amendment and the other documents in connection 
herewith and (b) all fees due and payable under the Credit Agreement and under any 
separate fee agreement entered into by the parties pursuant to the Credit Agreement. 
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Appendix D: Additional Specification Robustness 
Table D1. Lender Forbearance: Optimal Bandwidth 
This table presents borrower-(loan)package-quarter level fixed effects regression estimates of VIOLATION, an indicator 
that equals one if the borrower discloses a material covenant violation in an SEC filing, and zero otherwise, on 
NEGATIVE_SLACK, an indicator that equals one if the borrower is in breach of at least one covenant threshold, and 
zero otherwise, and control variables. The bandwidth is selected using the two-sided coverage error rate optimality 
criterion, and it restricts the sample to include covenant slack in the [-1.83, 3.37] range (Calonico et al. (2014), (2015)). 
Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors are clustered by borrower, and presented in parentheses. ***, **, and * denote 
results significant at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels. 
Dependent variable: VIOLATION 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
NEGATIVE_SLACK 3.977*** 3.934*** 4.242*** 3.632*** 2.611*** 2.383*** 
 (0.809) (0.781) (0.782) (0.733) (0.723) (0.748) 
       
Slack control:       
  Polynomial order Linear Linear Linear Linear Linear Linear 
  Bandwidth Optimal Optimal Optimal Optimal Optimal Optimal 
Fixed Effects:       
_Industry No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
_Year-quarter No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
_Industry × Year-quarter No No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
_Lender No No No Yes Yes Yes 
_Borrower No No No No Yes Yes 
_Lender × Borrower No No No No No Yes 
R2 0.0247 0.0404 0.1030 0.1418 0.3088 0.3174 
Obs. 74,220 74,220 74,119 74,111 74,033 73,981 
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Table D2. Lender Forbearance: Tightest Local Bandwidth 
This table presents borrower-(loan)package-quarter level fixed effects regression estimates of VIOLATION, an indicator 
that equals one if the borrower discloses a material covenant violation in an SEC filing, and zero otherwise, on 
NEGATIVE_SLACK, an indicator that equals one if the borrower is in breach of at least one covenant threshold, and 
zero otherwise, and control variables. The local bandwidth restricts the sample to include covenant slack in the [-0.521, 
0.424] range. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors are clustered by borrower, and presented in parentheses. ***, 
**, and * denote results significant at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels. 
Dependent variable: VIOLATION 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
NEGATIVE_SLACK 2.523** 2.675** 3.180*** 3.503*** 2.853** 3.000** 
 (1.099) (1.079) (1.132) (1.135) (1.125) (1.172) 
       
Slack control:       
  Polynomial order Linear Linear Linear Linear Linear Linear 
  Bandwidth Local Local Local Local Local Local 
Fixed Effects:       
_Industry No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
_Year-quarter No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
_Industry × Year-quarter No No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
_Lender No No No Yes Yes Yes 
_Borrower No No No No Yes Yes 
_Lender × Borrower No No No No No Yes 
R2 0.0156 0.0350 0.1309 0.1946 0.4074 0.4157 
Obs. 27,431 27,431 27,160 27,139 26,965 26,855 
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Table D3. Optimal Regression Discontinuity Specification Robustness 
This table presents regression discontinuity design estimates of VIOLATION, an indicator that equals one if the 
borrower discloses a material covenant violation in an SEC filing, and zero otherwise, on NEGATIVE_SLACK, an 
indicator that equals one if the borrower is in breach of at least one covenant threshold, and zero otherwise. 
Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors are clustered by borrower, and presented in parentheses. ***, **, and * denote 
results significant at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels. Polynomial control functions are estimated using a local Epanechnikov 
kernel. The specification uses optimal bin sizes and selects optimal bandwidths using the two-sided coverage error rate 
optimality criterion (Calonico et al. (2014), (2015)). Optimal bandwidths and the implied effective number of 
observations are reported for each specification. 
 VIOLATION 
  (1) (2) (3) 
NEGATIVE_SLACK 4.839*** 3.758*** 3.459*** 
 (0.744) (0.836) (0.894) 
    
Poly. Order 0 1 2 
Optimal BW [0.43, 1.21] [1.83, 3.37] [4.35, 9.14] 
Kernel Epanech. Epanech. Epanech. 
S.E. Clusters Borrower Borrower Borrower 
Effective Obs. 43,109 74,228 82,207 
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Table D4. Measurement Robustness: Optimal Bandwidth 
This table presents borrower-(loan)package-quarter level fixed effects regression estimates of VIOLATION, an indicator 
that equals one if the borrower discloses a material covenant violation in an SEC filing, and zero otherwise, on 
NEGATIVE_SLACK, an indicator that equals one if the borrower is in breach of at least one covenant threshold, and 
zero otherwise, and control variables. Column (1) replicates the baseline specification in Column (3) of Table 2, but 
defines NEGATIVE_SLACK based only on breaches of covenant thresholds for covenants without modifications (i.e., 
Quick Ratio, Current Ratio, Net Worth, and Tangible Net Worth). Column (2) replicates the baseline specification in 
Column (3) of Table 2, but now analyzes the subsample of loans that only use covenants not subject to modifications 
(i.e., Quick Ratio, Current Ratio, Net Worth, Tangible Net Worth). Column (3) replicates the baseline specification in 
Column (3) of Table 2, but only for the subset of loans that are not renegotiated before maturity. Column (4) replicates 
the baseline specification in Column (3) of Table 2, but only for the subset of loans with covenants without dynamic 
thresholds. The bandwidth is selected using the two-sided coverage error rate optimality criterion, and it restricts the 
sample to include covenant slack in the [-1.83, 3.37] range (Calonico et al. 2014, 2015). Standard errors are 
heteroscedasticity-robust, clustered at the borrower level, and presented in parentheses. ***, **, and * denote results 
significant at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels. 
Dependent variable: VIOLATION 
 
Breach No 
Modification 
Covenant 
 Only No 
Modification 
Covenants 
 
Only No Loan  
Renegotiations 
 Only No 
Dynamic 
Thresholds 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
NEGATIVE_SLACK 5.079***  15.971**  5.123***  3.389*** 
 (0.920)  (6.167)  (1.622)  (1.036) 
        
Slack control:        
  Polynomial order Linear  Linear  Linear  Linear 
  Bandwidth Optimal  Optimal  Optimal  Optimal 
Fixed Effects:        
_Industry × Year-quarter Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
R2 0.1027  0.3486  0.1347  0.1002 
Obs. 74,119  1,218  21,253  43,531 
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Table D5. Dynamics of Lender Forbearance: Optimal Bandwidth 
This table presents borrower-(loan)package-quarter level fixed effects regression estimates of VIOLATION, an indicator 
that equals one if the borrower discloses a material covenant violation in an SEC filing, and zero otherwise, on 
NEGATIVE_SLACK, an indicator that equals one if the borrower is in breach of at least one covenant threshold, and 
zero otherwise, interacted with past contracting outcomes and control variables. Column (1) interacts 
NEGATIVE_SLACK with MULTIPLE_BREACHES. Column (2) interacts NEGATIVE_SLACK with 
PRIOR_VIOLATION. Column (3) interacts NEGATIVE_SLACK with PRIOR_FORBEARANCE.  These variables 
are described in Table 5 and in the variable description appendix. The bandwidth is selected using the two-sided 
coverage error rate optimality criterion, and it restricts the sample to include covenant slack in the [-1.83, 3.37] range 
(Calonico et al. (2014), (2015)). Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors are clustered by borrower, and presented in 
parentheses. ***, **, and * denote results significant at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels. 
Dependent variable: VIOLATION    
  (1) (2) (3) 
NEGATIVE_SLACK 3.040*** 1.827*** 13.881*** 
 (0.801) (0.598) (1.101) 
MULTIPLE_BREACHES × NEGATIVE_SLACK 4.618***   
 (1.219)   
PRIOR_VIOLATION × NEGATIVE_SLACK  12.691***  
  (2.272)  
PRIOR_FORBEARANCE × NEGATIVE_SLACK   -14.372*** 
   (1.147) 
    
Slack control:    
  Polynomial order Linear Linear Linear 
  Bandwidth Optimal Optimal Optimal 
Fixed Effects:    
_Industry × Year-quarter Yes Yes Yes 
R2 0.1053 0.2023 0.1317 
Obs. 74,119 74,119 74,119 
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Table D6. Lender Forbearance and Credit Conditions: Optimal Bandwidth 
This table presents borrower-(loan)package-quarter level fixed effects regression estimates of VIOLATION, an indicator 
that equals one if the borrower discloses a material covenant violation in an SEC filing, and zero otherwise, on 
NEGATIVE_SLACK, an indicator that equals one if the borrower is in breach of at least one covenant threshold, and 
zero otherwise, interacted with credit cycle proxies and control variables. Observations from 1995 and 2008 are 
eliminated due to cross-sectional data limitations. Column (1) interacts NEGATIVE_SLACK with TIGHT_CREDIT, 
an indicator that equals one if the net percentage of loan officers reporting a tightening of credit standards as per the 
Federal Reserve survey of senior loan officers exceeds its median value, and zero otherwise. Column (2) interacts 
NEGATIVE_SLACK with RECESSION, an indicator that equals one during an NBER recession, and zero otherwise. 
Column (3) interacts NEGATIVE_SLACK with HIGH_PCT_BREACH, an indicator that equals one if the percentage 
of outstanding loans in the lead arranger’s loan portfolio that are in breach of a covenant threshold exceeds its median 
value, and zero otherwise. Column (4) interacts NEGATIVE_SLACK with HIGH_PCT_BREACH_INDUSTRY, an 
indicator that equals one if the percentage of outstanding loans in the borrower’s industry that are in in breach of a 
covenant threshold exceeds its median value, and zero otherwise. The bandwidth is selected using the two-sided coverage 
error rate optimality criterion, and it restricts the sample to include covenant slack in the [-1.83, 3.37] range (Calonico 
et al. (2014), (2015)). Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors are clustered by borrower, and presented in parentheses. 
***, **, and * denote results significant at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels. 
Dependent variable: VIOLATION 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
NEGATIVE_SLACK 2.546*** 4.021*** 2.591*** 2.547** 
 (0.959) (0.860) (1.006) (1.102) 
TIGHT_CREDIT × NEGATIVE_SLACK 4.174***    
 (1.063)    
RECESSION × NEGATIVE_SLACK  2.610*   
  (1.459)   
HIGH_PCT_BREACH × NEGATIVE_SLACK   3.083***  
   (0.983)  
HIGH_PCT_BREACH_INDUSTRY × NEGATIVE_SLACK    2.977*** 
    (1.040) 
Slack control:     
  Polynomial order Linear Linear Linear Linear 
  Bandwidth Optimal Optimal Optimal Optimal 
Fixed Effects:     
_Industry × Year-quarter Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R2 0.1016 0.1004 0.1010 0.1008 
Obs. 67,172 67,172 67,172 67,172 
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Table D7. Lender Forbearance and Coordination Costs: Optimal Bandwidth 
This table presents borrower-(loan)package-quarter level fixed effects regression estimates of VIOLATION, an indicator 
that equals one if the borrower discloses a material covenant violation in an SEC filing, and zero otherwise, on 
NEGATIVE_SLACK, an indicator that equals one if the borrower is in breach of at least one covenant threshold, and 
zero otherwise, interacted with proxies for the cost of coordination among the lending syndicate and control variables. 
Column (1) interacts NEGATIVE_SLACK with SYNDICATION. Columns (2)-(6) estimate the effects of 
LARGE_SYNDICATE, DISPERSE_SYNDICATE, LOW_RETAIN_SHARE, INSTITUTIONS, and 
MANY_LENDERS_TO_PASS. These variables are defined in Table 8 and in the variable definitions appendix. The 
bandwidth is selected using the two-sided coverage error rate optimality criterion, and it restricts the sample to include 
covenant slack in the [-1.83, 3.37] range (Calonico et al. (2014), (2015)). Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors are 
clustered by borrower, and presented in parentheses. ***, **, and * denote results significant at the 1%, 5%, and 10% 
levels. 
Dependent variable: VIOLATION 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
NEGATIVE_SLACK 5.560*** 4.927*** 5.340*** 5.554*** 3.578*** 4.933*** 
 (0.914) (1.160) (1.206) (1.301) (0.971) (1.366) 
SYNDICATION × NEGATIVE_SLACK -2.630**      
 (1.067)      
LARGE_SYNDICATE × 
NEGATIVE_SLACK 
 -3.097**     
  (1.429)     
DISPERSE_SYNDICATE × 
NEGATIVE_SLACK 
  -3.811***    
   (1.398)    
LOW_RETAIN_SHARE × 
NEGATIVE_SLACK 
   -4.354***   
    (1.303)   
INSTITUTIONS × NEGATIVE_SLACK     0.161  
     (1.555)  
MANY_LENDERS_TO_PASS × 
NEGATIVE_SLACK      -2.649* 
      (1.440) 
Slack control:       
  Polynomial order Linear Linear Linear Linear Linear Linear 
  Bandwidth Optimal Optimal Optimal Optimal Optimal Optimal 
Fixed Effects:       
_Industry × Year-quarter Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R2 0.1050 0.1385 0.1400 0.1400 0.1359 0.1373 
Obs. 74,119 40,100 40,100 40,100 40,100 40,100 
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Table D8. Lender Forbearance, Hold-up, and External Financing: Optimal Bandwidth 
This table presents borrower-(loan)package-quarter level fixed effects regression estimates of VIOLATION, an indicator 
that equals one if the borrower discloses a material covenant violation in an SEC filing, and zero otherwise, on 
NEGATIVE_SLACK, an indicator that equals one if the borrower is in breach of at least one covenant threshold, and 
zero otherwise, interacted with proxies for bank competition and control variables. Column (1) interacts 
NEGATIVE_SLACK with RELATIONSHIP. Column (2) interacts NEGATIVE_SLACK with MULTIPLE_LEADS. 
Column (3) interacts NEGATIVE_SLACK with BOND_ACCESS. Column (4) interacts NEGATIVE_SLACK with 
LOW_WHITED_WU. Column (5) interacts NEGATIVE_SLACK with LARGE. These variable are defined in Table 
9 and in the variable definitions appendix. The bandwidth is selected using the two-sided coverage error rate optimality 
criterion, and it restricts the sample to include covenant slack in the [-1.83, 3.37] range (Calonico et al. (2014), (2015)). 
Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors are clustered by borrower, and presented in parentheses. ***, **, and * denote 
results significant at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels. 
Dependent variable: VIOLATION 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
NEGATIVE_SLACK 0.013 5.397*** 7.660*** 6.184*** 7.928*** 
 (1.304) (0.872) (0.965) (0.919) (0.999) 
RELATIONSHIP × NEGATIVE_SLACK 4.541***     
 (1.249)     
MULTIPLE_LEADS × 
NEGATIVE_SLACK 
 -2.164***    
  (0.656)    
BOND_ACCESS × NEGATIVE_SLACK   -6.870***   
   (1.117)   
LOW_WHITED_WU × 
NEGATIVE_SLACK 
   -5.149***  
    (1.091)  
LARGE × NEGATIVE_SLACK     -8.226*** 
     (1.043) 
      
Slack control:      
  Polynomial order Linear Linear Linear Linear Linear 
  Bandwidth Optimal Optimal Optimal Optimal Optimal 
Fixed Effects:      
_Industry × Year-quarter Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R2 0.1037 0.1036 0.1125 0.1111 0.1211 
Obs. 74,119 74,119 74,119 74,119 74,119 
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Table D9. Lender Forbearance and Ex Ante Explicit Contracting: Optimal Bandwidth 
This table presents borrower-(loan)package-quarter level fixed effects regression estimates of VIOLATION, an indicator 
that equals one if the borrower discloses a material covenant violation in an SEC filing, and zero otherwise, on 
NEGATIVE_SLACK, an indicator that equals one if the borrower is in breach of at least one covenant threshold, and 
zero otherwise, interacted with EX_ANTE_STRICT, an indicator that equals one if the loan has an ex ante strict 
(i.e., above median) covenant package, and zero otherwise, and control variables. Columns (1) and (2) measure 
EX_ANTE_STRICT using the initial covenant slack of the covenant package, and columns (3) and (4) use the measure 
of initial contract strictness from Murfin (2012) for the sample of loans with more than two covenants. Data restrictions 
limit the sample in columns (3) and (4). The first quarter of each loan is excluded from the sample. The bandwidth is 
selected using the two-sided coverage error rate optimality criterion, and it restricts the sample to include covenant 
slack in the [-1.83, 3.37] range (Calonico et al. (2014), (2015)). Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors are clustered 
by borrower, and presented in parentheses. ***, **, and * denote results significant at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels. 
Dependent variable: VIOLATION      
  (1) (2)  (3) (4) 
NEGATIVE_SLACK 6.359*** 3.482***  4.856*** 2.091* 
 (1.030) (0.952)  (1.083) (1.192) 
EX_ANTE_STRICT × NEGATIVE_SLACK -4.286*** -2.839***  -3.268** -1.358 
 (1.230) (1.091)  (1.426) (1.381) 
      
Slack control:      
  Polynomial order Linear Linear  Linear Linear 
  Bandwidth Optimal Optimal  Optimal Optimal 
Fixed Effects:      
_Industry × Year-quarter Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
_Lender × Borrower No Yes  No Yes 
R2 0.1137 0.3405  0.1481 0.3630 
Obs. 67,479 67,338  46,124 46,043 
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Table D10. Lender Forbearance and Reputation: Optimal Bandwidth 
This table presents borrower-(loan)package-quarter level fixed effects regression estimates of VIOLATION, an indicator 
that equals one if the borrower discloses a material covenant violation in an SEC filing, and zero otherwise, on 
NEGATIVE_SLACK, an indicator that equals one if the borrower is in breach of at least one covenant threshold, and 
zero otherwise, interacted with proxies for lead arranger reputation and control variables. Columns (1) and (2) interact 
NEGATIVE_SLACK with TOP_10, and columns (3) and (4) interact NEGATIVE_SLACK with 
lnLEAGUE_RANK. These variables are defined in Table 11 and in the variable definitions appendix. The bandwidth 
is selected using the two-sided coverage error rate optimality criterion, and it restricts the sample to include covenant 
slack in the [-1.83, 3.37] range (Calonico et al. (2014), (2015)). Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors are clustered 
by borrower, and presented in parentheses. ***, **, and * denote results significant at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels. 
Dependent variable: VIOLATION      
  (1) (2)  (3) (4) 
NEGATIVE_SLACK 5.078*** 3.202***  1.200 -1.088 
 (0.835) (0.804)  (1.413) (1.291) 
TOP_10× NEGATIVE_SLACK -2.648*** -2.459***    
 (0.988) (0.858)    
lnLEAGUE_RANK × NEGATIVE_SLACK    0.964** 1.104*** 
    (0.377) (0.347) 
      
Slack control:      
  Polynomial order Linear Linear  Linear Linear 
  Bandwidth Optimal Optimal  Optimal Optimal 
Fixed Effects:      
_Industry × Year-quarter Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
_Lender × Borrower No Yes  No Yes 
R2 0.1045 0.3178  0.1042 0.3180 
Obs. 74,119 73,981  74,119 73,981 
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Table D11. Lender Forbearance: Manipulation Controls 
This table presents borrower-(loan)package-quarter level fixed effects regression estimates of VIOLATION, an indicator 
that equals one if the borrower discloses a material covenant violation in an SEC filing, and zero otherwise, on 
NEGATIVE_SLACK, an indicator that equals one if the borrower is in breach of at least one covenant threshold, and 
zero otherwise. Borrower level control variables include total accruals, discretionary accruals (Teoh, Welch, and Wong 
(1998)), market-to-book, the natural log of one plus total assets, and return-on-assets. Accruals measures are 
standardized for interpretation. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors are clustered by borrower, and presented in 
parentheses. ***, **, and * denote results significant at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels. 
Dependent variable: VIOLATION 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
NEGATIVE_SLACK 9.883*** 9.509*** 9.350*** 8.975*** 5.966*** 6.093*** 
 (0.677) (0.643) (0.641) (0.618) (0.605) (0.645) 
       
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Slack control:       
  Polynomial order Linear Linear Linear Linear Linear Linear 
  Bandwidth Global Global Global Global Global Global 
Fixed Effects:       
_Industry No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
_Year-quarter No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
_Industry × Year-quarter No No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
_Lender No No No Yes Yes Yes 
_Borrower No No No No Yes Yes 
_Lender × Borrower No No No No No Yes 
R2 0.0769 0.0937 0.1457 0.1732 0.3223 0.3318 
Obs. 87,867 87,867 87,787 87,784 87,733 87,687 
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Table D12. Manipulation and Enforcement in the Cross-section of Covenant Types 
This figure presents McCrary (2008) density break plots for the subset of covenant types with no manipulation (i.e., 
debt/equity, leverage, cash interest coverage, debt service coverage, EBITDA, quick ratio, current ratio, and net worth). 
The table below constructs measures of SLACK and NEGATIVE_SLACK based only on this subset of covenants and 
presents estimates from specifications as in Table 2.  
 
 
  
Dependent variable: VIOLATION 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
NEGATIVE_SLACK 13.429*** 12.923*** 13.031*** 12.165*** 9.815*** 9.919*** 
 (1.044) (0.954) (0.932) (0.895) (0.897) (0.922) 
       
Fixed Effects:       
_Industry No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
_Year-quarter No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
_Industry × Year-quarter No No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
_Lender No No No Yes Yes Yes 
_Borrower No No No No Yes Yes 
_Lender × Borrower No No No No No Yes 
R2 0.0498 0.0784 0.1407 0.1797 0.3446 0.3493 
Obs. 61,350 61,350 61,187 61,182 61,151 61,136 
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Table D13. Enforcement Outcomes: Optimal Bandwidth 
Columns (1) and (3) of this table presents borrower-(loan)package-quarter level regression estimates of FEE, an 
indicator that equals one if the borrower discloses fee payment in an 8-K filing, and zero otherwise, and AMENDMENT, 
an indicator that equals one if the borrower’s loan is renegotiated, and zero otherwise, on VIOLATION, an indicator 
that equals one if the borrower discloses a material covenant violation in an SEC filing, and zero otherwise, and control 
variables for observations in which the borrower is in breach of at least one covenant threshold. Columns (2) and (4) 
of this table present fuzzy regression discontinuity design estimates of FEE and AMENDMENT, respectively, on 
Violation. The relevant first stage results for these specifications are presented in column (3) of Table 2.  The bandwidth 
is selected using the two-sided coverage error rate optimality criterion, and it restricts the sample to include covenant 
slack in the [-1.83, 3.37] range (Calonico et al. (2014), (2015)). Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors are clustered 
by borrower, and presented in parentheses. ***, **, and * denote results significant at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels. 
Dependent variable:  FEE  AMENDMENT 
 OLS  Fuzzy RD  OLS  Fuzzy RD 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
VIOLATION 1.289***  18.359***  4.655***  41.879** 
 (0.386)  (6.709)  (1.193)  (20.795) 
        
Slack control:        
  Polynomial order Linear  Linear  Linear  Linear 
  Bandwidth Optimal  Optimal  Optimal  Optimal 
Fixed Effects:        
_Industry × Year-quarter Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
FFirst Stage   205.17    205.17 
R2 0.1397    0.1121   
Obs. 74,119  74,119  74,119  74,119 
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Table D14. Enforcement Outcomes: Optimal Specification 
Panel A of this table presents regression discontinuity design estimates of FEE, an indicator that equals one if the 
borrower discloses a waiver or amendment fee payment in an 8-K filing, and zero otherwise, and AMENDMENT, an 
indicator that equals one if the borrower’s loan is renegotiated, and zero otherwise, on NEGATIVE_SLACK, an 
indicator that equals one if the borrower is in breach of at least one covenant threshold, and zero otherwise. Panel B 
of this table presents fuzzy regression discontinuity estimates in which VIOLATION is instrumented using the cutoff 
in covenant slack at the covenant threshold. Estimates corresponding to the first stage are presented in Table D3. 
Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors are clustered by borrower, and presented in parentheses. ***, **, and * denote 
results significant at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels. Polynomial control functions are estimated using a local Epanechnikov 
kernel. The specification uses optimal bin sizes and selects optimal bandwidths using the two-sided coverage error rate 
optimality criterion (Calonico et al. (2014), (2015)). Optimal bandwidths and the implied effective number of 
observations are reported for each specification.  
Panel A. Reduced Form 
 FEE  AMENDMENT 
  (1) (2) (3)  (4) (5) (6) 
NEGATIVE_SLACK 0.656*** 0.585** 0.645**  3.495*** 2.848*** 2.500*** 
 (0.219) (0.278) (0.297)  (0.763) (0.875) (0.926) 
        
Poly. order 0 1 2  0 1 2 
Optimal BW 
[1.49, 
1.78] 
[3.59, 
7.39] 
[7.12, 
17.42] 
 [1.33, 
1.52] 
[4.25, 
6.87] 
[9.92, 
11.12] 
Kernel Epanech. Epanech. Epanech.  Epanech. Epanech. Epanech. 
S.E. Clusters Borrower Borrower Borrower  Borrower Borrower Borrower 
Effective Obs. 60,405 80,853 85,366  55,797 81,412 85,599 
 
Panel B. Fuzzy RD 
  FEE  AMENDMENT 
   (1) (2) (3)  (4) (5) (6) 
VIOLATION�   11.504*** 14.348** 15.864*  68.765*** 66.056** 73.427** 
  (4.154) (7.250) (8.310)  (18.800) (27.087) (31.004) 
         
Poly. Order  0 1 2  0 1 2 
Optimal BW  [1.22, 1.27] [3.11, 5.40] [7.90, 12.61]  [0.75, 1.33] [2.45, 5.04] [7.35, 10.79] 
Kernel  Epanech. Epanech. Epanech.  Epanech. Epanech. Epanech. 
S.E. Clusters  Borrower Borrower Borrower  Borrower Borrower Borrower 
Effective Obs.  50,724 79,362 85,215  48,398 77,989 84,670 
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Figure 1. Lender Forbearance Around Covenant Thresholds 
 
This figure presents estimates of the discontinuity in contract enforcement at the covenant threshold. Negative values 
of covenant slack correspond to a covenant breach. The local polynomial control functions (black solid lines) are 
estimated using an Epanechnikov kernel. The dashed gray lines correspond to 95% confidence intervals.  
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Figure 2. Placebo Tests 
These figures present evidence on the (lack of) existence of a discontinuity in enforcement around placebo covenant 
thresholds. In Panel A, we present evidence from six placebo thresholds at SLACK = {-3, -2, -1, 1, 2, 3} as well as the 
corresponding estimate for the true threshold of SLACK = 0. These estimates correspond to our main specification 
presented in Column (1) of Table 2, though they are restricted to a bandwidth of one unit of SLACK, which allows us 
to avoid the support of SLACK crossing the true covenant threshold in each placebo test. The red scatter presents the 
coefficient estimates of the discontinuity in enforcement at the placebo (or true) threshold and the grey bars correspond 
to 95% confidence intervals derived from robust standard errors clustered at the borrower level. The dashed red vertical 
lines separate the estimate corresponding to the true covenant threshold from the placebo thresholds. In Panel B, we 
repeat the placebo test analysis for 800 placebo thresholds in the ranges [-5, -1] and [1, 5], excluding observations within 
one unit of SLACK from the true covenant threshold in every specification, and present the t-statistics for the 
discontinuity. The vertical dashed red line corresponds to the t-statistic for our estimate using the true covenant 
threshold.  
 
(a) Selected Placebo Test Estimates 
 
(b) Distribution of Placebo t-statistics 
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Figure 3. Lender Forbearance and Credit Tightening Over Time 
 
This figure shows the quarterly time series variation in the probability that a lender enforces a breach of contract (solid 
line) and the net percentage of loan officers that report tightening credit standards from the Federal Reserve’s survey 
of senior loan officers (dashed line).  
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Figure 4. Manipulation in the Cross-Section 
This figure presents McCrary (2008) density break plots for observations with high enforcement characteristics (Panel 
A) and low enforcement characteristics (Panel B). High and low enforcement characteristics observations are identified 
by expanding the sample by N where N is the number of characteristics, and the nth duplicate breach is sorted into the 
high and low enforcement group based on whether the nth characteristic of the breach scores high or low on enforcement 
(i.e., whether it has higher or lower enforcement as estimated in Tables 5 through 10). The figures show evidence of 
manipulation of covenant slack around covenant thresholds in both the high and low enforcement groups. The 
magnitude of the discontinuity is economically similar in both figures. The table below presents the density break 
statistics using optimal bin sizes and bandwidths for high and low enforcement observations. In the table, the standard 
errors are multiplied by a factor of 
√
𝑁𝑁  to correct for the expanded sample size. The p-value used to assess the statistical 
differences between the density break estimates for the high and low enforcement groups corresponds to a two-sided 
difference-in-means test.  
 
(a) High Enforcement 
 
(b) Low Enforcement 
 
Sample: High Enforcement  Low Enforcement 
  (1)  (2) 
Discontinuity 0.2063***  0.2327*** 
 (0.0466)  (0.0393) 
    
Optimal bin size 0.0043  0.0037 
Optimal bandwidth 0.7063  0.7539 
Difference p-value 0.6650 
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Figure 5. Local Continuity of Observables Around Breach Cutoff 
 
This figure shows local continuity in observable borrower and loan characteristics around the zero covenant slack cutoff. 
The purpose of this figure is to analyze whether the composition of borrowers that just-breach their covenant thresholds 
are systematically different than those that just avoid breaching. In each subfigure, we plot local polynomial kernel 
estimates (black lines) and 95% confidence intervals (shaded area) of characteristics against covenant slack in a one 
standard deviation window around the zero covenant slack threshold. In subfigures (a)-(f), we plot sales growth, market-
to-book ratio, return-on-assets, a loss firm indicator, total assets, and the standardized Whited-Wu index. In subfigures 
(g)-(l), we plot loan amount, loan spread, loan maturity, collateral indicator, number of tranches, and number of 
covenants.  
 
 
(a) Sales growth 
 
(b) Market/Book 
 
(c) ROA 
 
(d) 1[Loss firm] 
 
(e) Total Assets 
 
(f) WW Index (std.) 
 
(g) Loan Amount 
 
(h) Loan Spread 
 
(i) Loan Maturity 
 
(j) 1[Collateral] 
 
(k) Num. of Tranches 
 
(l) Num. of Covenants 
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Figure 6. Distributions of Fees 
 
This figure presents kernel density plots of six common types of fees observed in the syndicated loan market. The first 
and second subfigure present the distributions of waiver fees (i.e., fees observed coincident with enforcement) and 
amendment fees (i.e., fees observed outside of covenant breaches), respectively. The next four subfigures present the 
four most frequently observed fees per Berg et al. (2016): upfront fees, commitment fees, annual fees, and utilization 
fees.  
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Figure 7. Cross-sectional Heterogeneity in Waiver Fees 
 
This figure presents kernel density plots of waiver fees (in basis points) for breaches with high enforcement 
characteristics (blue solid line) and low enforcement characteristics (red dashed line). Breaches with enforcement 
characteristics are identified by expanding the sample by N where N is the number of characteristics, and the nth 
duplicate breach is sorted into the high and low enforcement group based on whether the nth characteristic of the breach 
scores high or low on enforcement (i.e., whether it exhibits higher or lower enforcement as estimated in Tables 5 through 
10). The table below presents the difference in mean waiver fees between breaches with high and low enforcement 
characteristics, where the p-value corresponds to a two-sided difference-in-means test.   
 
 
 
 High Enforcement  Low Enforcement  Difference 
  (1)  (2)  (3) 
Waiver fee 34.88  28.80  6.08** 
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Table 1. Summary Statistics 
This table presents summary statistics for the regression variables of interest. Variable definitions are in 
Appendix A. 
  Mean SD P25 Median P75 
VIOLATION 6.39%     
NEGATIVE_SLACK 31.11%     
FEE 0.69%     
AMENDMENT 7.81%     
SLACK 1.28 12.36 -0.41 0.40 1.64 
STRICTNESS 85.37% 12.22% 81.20% 89.20% 93.96% 
SPREAD (bp) 168 113 75 150 250 
AMOUNT ($mm) 465 944 71.4 200 500 
MATURITY (mos.) 51.53 18.41 36 57 60 
SECURED 59.46%     
CREDIT_TIGHTENING 10.97 25.07 -7 5.4 25 
RECESSION 31.15%     
PORTFOLIO_NEGATIVE_SLACK (%) 30.77% 22.61% 16.67% 27.31% 39.29% 
INDUSTRY_NEGATIVE_SLACK (%) 32.73% 13.51% 23.33% 32.47% 41.06% 
TOP_10 36.40%     
LEAGUE_RANK 41 45 6 21 65 
SYNDICATION 54.12%     
NUM_LENDERS 6.24 6.39 2 4 8 
LENDER_HHI 0.27 0.34 0.05 0.10 0.34 
RETAINED_SHARE 26.45% 18.56% 12% 20% 36.67% 
NUM_INSTITUTIONS 0.03 0.28 0 0 0 
LENDERS_TO_PASS 4.83 3.28 2 4 7 
RELATIONSHIP 92.96%     
MULTIPLE_LEADS 56.70%     
BOND_ACCESS 57.28%     
WHITED_WU -0.31 0.09 -0.38 -0.31 -0.25 
SIZE ($mm) 2,889 9,564 134 595 2,092 
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Table 2. Lender Forbearance 
This table presents borrower-(loan)package-quarter level fixed effects regression estimates of VIOLATION, an indicator 
that equals one if the borrower discloses a material covenant violation in an SEC filing, and zero otherwise, on 
NEGATIVE_SLACK, an indicator that equals one if the borrower is in breach of at least one covenant threshold, and 
zero otherwise, and control variables. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors are clustered by borrower, and 
presented in parentheses. ***, **, and * denote results significant at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels. 
Dependent variable: VIOLATION 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
NEGATIVE_SLACK 10.654*** 10.030*** 9.894*** 9.091*** 5.754*** 5.869*** 
 (0.701) (0.645) (0.622) (0.580) (0.546) (0.580) 
       
Slack control:       
  Polynomial order Linear Linear Linear Linear Linear Linear 
  Bandwidth Global Global Global Global Global Global 
Fixed Effects:       
_Industry No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
_Year-quarter No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
_Industry×Year-quarter No No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
_Lender No No No Yes Yes Yes 
_Borrower No No No No Yes Yes 
_Lender×Borrower No No No No No Yes 
R2 0.0474 0.0705 0.1222 0.1575 0.3184 0.3270 
Obs. 99,636 99,636 99,573 99,570 99,544 99,516 
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Table 3. Lender Forbearance: Specification Robustness 
This table presents borrower-(loan)package-quarter level fixed effects regression estimates of VIOLATION, an indicator 
that equals one if the borrower discloses a material covenant violation in an SEC filing, and zero otherwise, on 
NEGATIVE_SLACK, an indicator that equals one if the borrower is in breach of at least one covenant threshold, and 
zero otherwise, and control variables. Column (1) replicates the baseline specification in Column (3) of Table 2, but 
omits the linear control for the distance to covenant thresholds. Column (2) replicates the baseline specification in 
Column (3) of Table 2, but replaces the linear control for the distance to covenant thresholds with a quadratic control 
function. Columns (3) and (4) omit the polynomial control functions, but limit the estimation window to observations 
in which the borrower is within two and five standard deviations of breaching a covenant threshold, respectively. 
Columns (5) and (6) implement the same bandwidth restriction as in Columns (3) and (4), but also include a linear 
control function for the distance to covenant thresholds. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors are clustered by 
borrower, and presented in parentheses. ***, **, and * denote results significant at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels. 
Dependent variable: VIOLATION 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
NEGATIVE_SLACK 10.534*** 9.124*** 7.051*** 8.499*** 4.167*** 5.341*** 
 (0.618) (0.625) (0.601) (0.594) (0.779) (0.689) 
       
Slack control:       
  Polynomial order None Quadratic None None Linear Linear 
  Bandwidth Global Global 2 5 2 5 
Fixed Effects:       
_Industry×Year-quarter Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R2 0.1209 0.1245 0.1094 0.1127 0.1114 0.1166 
Obs. 99,573 99,573 65,063 81,273 65,063 81,273 
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Table 4. Lender Forbearance: Measurement Robustness 
This table presents borrower-(loan)package-quarter level fixed effects regression estimates of VIOLATION, an indicator 
that equals one if the borrower discloses a material covenant violation in an SEC filing, and zero otherwise, on 
NEGATIVE_SLACK, an indicator that equals one if the borrower is in breach of at least one covenant threshold, and 
zero otherwise, and control variables. Column (1) replicates the baseline specification in Column (3) of Table 2, but 
defines NEGATIVE_SLACK based only on breaches of covenant thresholds for covenants without modifications (i.e., 
Quick Ratio, Current Ratio, Net Worth, Tangible Net Worth). Column (2) replicates the baseline specification in 
Column (3) of Table 2, but now analyzes the subsample of loans that only use covenants not subject to modifications 
(i.e., Quick Ratio, Current Ratio, Net Worth, Tangible Net Worth). Column (3) replicates the baseline specification in 
Column (3) of Table 2, but only for the subset of loans that are not renegotiated before maturity. Column (4) replicates 
the baseline specification in Column (3) of Table 2, but only for the subset of loans with covenants that lack dynamic 
thresholds. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors are clustered by borrower, and presented in parentheses. ***, **, 
and * denote results significant at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels. 
Dependent variable: VIOLATION 
 
Breach No 
Modification 
Covenant 
 Only No 
Modification 
Covenants 
 
Only No Loan  
Renegotiations 
 Only No 
Dynamic 
Thresholds 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
NEGATIVE_SLACK 10.467***  13.370***  11.594***  9.896*** 
 (0.995)  (3.176)  (0.994)  (0.810) 
        
Slack control:        
  Polynomial order Linear  Linear  Linear  Linear 
  Bandwidth Global  Global  Global  Global 
Fixed Effects:        
_Industry × Year-quarter Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
R2 0.1086  0.2688  0.1484  0.1224 
Obs. 99,573  3,987  30,359  57,893 
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Table 5. Dynamics of Lender Forbearance 
This table presents borrower-(loan)package-quarter level fixed effects regression estimates of VIOLATION, an indicator 
that equals one if the borrower discloses a material covenant violation in an SEC filing, and zero otherwise, on 
NEGATIVE_SLACK, an indicator that equals one if the borrower is in breach of at least one covenant threshold, and 
zero otherwise, interacted with past contracting outcomes and control variables. Column (1) interacts 
NEGATIVE_SLACK with MULTIPLE_BREACHES, an indicator that equals one if borrower i is in breach of more 
than one financial covenant in quarter t, and zero otherwise. Column (2) interacts NEGATIVE_SLACK with 
PRIOR_VIOLATION, an indicator that equals one if borrower i previously disclosed a material covenant violation in 
the past year, and zero otherwise. Column (3) interacts NEGATIVE_SLACK with PRIOR_FORBEARANCE, an 
indicator that equals one if borrower i breached at least one covenant of the loan package in the previous year but did 
not disclose a corresponding material covenant violation, and zero otherwise. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors 
are clustered by borrower, and presented in parentheses. ***, **, and * denote results significant at the 1%, 5%, and 
10% levels. 
Dependent variable: VIOLATION    
  (1) (2) (3) 
NEGATIVE_SLACK 6.153*** 4.153*** 22.728*** 
 (0.643) (0.332) (0.985) 
MULTIPLE_BREACHES × NEGATIVE_SLACK 7.702***   
 (1.035)   
PRIOR_VIOLATION × NEGATIVE_SLACK  13.940***  
  (1.787)  
PRIOR_FORBEARANCE × NEGATIVE_SLACK   -19.513*** 
   (1.011) 
    
Slack control:    
  Polynomial order Linear Linear Linear 
  Bandwidth Global Global Global 
Fixed Effects:    
_Industry × Year-quarter Yes Yes Yes 
R2 0.1294 0.2404 0.1743 
Obs. 99,573 99,573 99,573 
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Table 6. Lender Forbearance and Credit Conditions 
This table presents borrower-(loan)package-quarter level fixed effects regression estimates of VIOLATION, an indicator 
that equals one if the borrower discloses a material covenant violation in an SEC filing, and zero otherwise, on 
NEGATIVE_SLACK, an indicator that equals one if the borrower is in breach of at least one covenant threshold, and 
zero otherwise, interacted with credit cycle proxies and control variables. Observations from 1995 and 2008 are 
eliminated due to cross-sectional data limitations. Column (1) interacts NEGATIVE_SLACK with TIGHT_CREDIT, 
an indicator that equals one if the net percentage of loan officers reporting a tightening of credit standards as per the 
Federal Reserve survey of senior loan officers exceeds its median value, and zero otherwise. Column (2) interacts 
NEGATIVE_SLACK with RECESSION, an indicator that equals one during an NBER recession, and zero otherwise. 
Column (3) interacts NEGATIVE_SLACK with HIGH_PCT_BREACH an indicator that equals one if the percentage 
of outstanding loans in the lead arranger’s loan portfolio that are in breach of a covenant threshold exceeds its median 
value and zero otherwise. Column (4) interacts NEGATIVE_SLACK with HIGH_PCT_BREACH_INDUSTRY, an 
indicator that equals one if the percentage of outstanding loans in the borrower’s industry that are in in breach of a 
covenant threshold exceeds its median value, and zero otherwise. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors are clustered 
by borrower, and presented in parentheses. ***, **, and * denote results significant at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels. 
Dependent variable: VIOLATION 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
NEGATIVE_SLACK 7.906*** 9.806*** 8.127*** 9.039*** 
 (0.804) (0.685) (0.781) (1.030) 
     
TIGHT_CREDIT × NEGATIVE_SLACK 5.505*** (1.101)    
     
RECESSION × NEGATIVE_SLACK  3.647*** (1.354)   
     
HIGH_PCT_BREACH × NEGATIVE_SLACK   3.909*** (0.992)  
     
HIGH_PCT_BREACH_INDUSTRY× 
NEGATIVE_SLACK 
   
2.371** 
(1.164) 
     
Slack control:     
  Polynomial order Linear Linear Linear Linear 
  Bandwidth Global Global Global Global 
Fixed Effects:     
_Industry × Year-quarter Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R2 0.1233 0.1216 0.1221 0.1213 
Obs. 90,668 90,668 90,668 90,668 
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Table 7. Lender Forbearance and Coordination Costs 
This table presents borrower-(loan)package-quarter level fixed effects regression estimates of VIOLATION, an indicator 
that equals one if the borrower discloses a material covenant violation in an SEC filing, and zero otherwise, on 
NEGATIVE_SLACK, an indicator that equals one if the borrower is in breach of at least one covenant threshold, and 
zero otherwise, interacted with proxies for the cost of coordination among the lending syndicate and control variables. 
Column (1) interacts NEGATIVE_SLACK with SYNDICATION, an indicator that equals one if the distribution 
method is through syndication, and zero otherwise, and produces estimates for the full sample. Columns (2)-(5) estimate 
the effects of LARGE_SYNDICATE, an indicator that equals one if the number of participants in the syndicate exceeds 
the median level, and zero otherwise, DISPERSE_SYNDICATE, an indicator that equals one if the syndicate’s loan 
share HHI (i.e., sum of squared loan shares among syndicate participants) is lower than the median level, and zero 
otherwise, LOW_RETAIN_SHARE, an indicator that equals one if the fraction of the loan retained by the lead 
arranger is lower than the median level, and zero otherwise, INSTITUTIONS, an indicator that equals one if at least 
one non-bank institutional investor participates in the loan, and zero otherwise, respectively, for the sample of 
syndicated loans. Column (6) estimates the effect of MANY_LENDERS_TO_PASS, which an indicator that equals 
one if the smallest number of lenders required to vote for a covenant waiver based on initial loan shares and contractual 
voting rules exceeds the median level, and zero otherwise. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors are clustered by 
borrower, and presented in parentheses. ***, **, and * denote results significant at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels. 
Dependent variable: VIOLATION 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
NEGATIVE_SLACK 11.399*** 9.571*** 10.058*** 10.111*** 8.269*** 10.339*** 
 (0.793) (1.079) (1.123) (1.139) (0.811) (1.202) 
SYNDICATION × NEGATIVE_SLACK -3.043***      
 (1.020)      
LARGE_SYNDICATE × 
NEGATIVE_SLACK 
 -3.243**     
  (1.541)     
DISPERSE_SYNDICATE × 
NEGATIVE_SLACK 
  -4.149***    
   (1.391)    
LOW_RETAIN_SHARE × 
NEGATIVE_SLACK 
   -4.357***   
    (1.342)   
INSTITUTIONS × NEGATIVE_SLACK     3.867**  
     (1.847)  
MANY_LENDERS_TO_PASS × 
NEGATIVE_SLACK      -3.986*** 
      (1.413) 
Slack control:       
  Polynomial order Linear Linear Linear Linear Linear Linear 
  Bandwidth Global Global Global Global Global Global 
Fixed Effects:       
_Industry × Year-quarter Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R2 0.1242 0.1480 0.1484 0.1485 0.1451 0.1467 
Obs. 99,573 53,735 53,735 53,735 53,735 53,735 
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Table 8. Lender Forbearance, Hold-up, and External Financing 
This table presents borrower-(loan)package-quarter level fixed effects regression estimates of VIOLATION, an indicator 
that equals one if the borrower discloses a material covenant violation in an SEC filing, and zero otherwise, on 
NEGATIVE_SLACK, an indicator that equals one if the borrower is in breach of at least one covenant threshold, and 
zero otherwise, interacted with proxies for bank competition and control variables. Column (1) interacts 
NEGATIVE_SLACK with RELATIONSHIP, an indicator that equals one if the lead arranger has initiated at least 
one loan with the borrower previously, and zero otherwise. Column (2) interacts NEGATIVE_SLACK with 
MULTIPLE_LEADS, an indicator that equals one if the borrower has outstanding loans with at least two distinct lead 
arrangers simultaneously, and zero otherwise. Column (3) interacts NEGATIVE_SLACK with BOND_ACCESS, an 
indicator that equals one if the borrower has an S&P credit rating, and zero otherwise. Column (4) interacts 
NEGATIVE_SLACK with LOW_WHITED_WU, an indicator that equals one if borrower i’s standardized Whited-
Wu index is lower than its median value, and zero otherwise (i.e., higher values correspond to a higher cost of external 
financing). Column (5) interacts NEGATIVE_SLACK with LARGE, an indicator that equals one if borrower i has 
larger total assets than the median borrower, and zero otherwise. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors are clustered 
by borrower, and presented in parentheses. ***, **, and * denote results significant at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels. 
Dependent variable: VIOLATION 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
NEGATIVE_SLACK 3.827*** 10.953*** 14.042*** 12.368*** 14.388*** 
 (1.043) (0.689) (0.908) (0.847) (0.873) 
RELATIONSHIP × NEGATIVE_SLACK 6.495***     
 (1.083)     
MULTIPLE_LEADS × 
NEGATIVE_SLACK 
 -1.944***    
  (0.608)    
BOND_ACCESS × NEGATIVE_SLACK   -9.033***   
   (1.167)   
LOW_WHITED_WU × 
NEGATIVE_SLACK 
   -8.572***  
    (1.111)  
LARGE × NEGATIVE_SLACK     -
13.062*** 
     (1.054) 
      
Slack control:      
  Polynomial order Linear Linear Linear Linear Linear 
  Bandwidth Global Global Global Global Global 
Fixed Effects:      
_Industry × Year-quarter Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R2 0.1235 0.1225 0.1356 0.1358 0.1553 
Obs. 99,573 99,573 99,573 99,573 99,573 
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Table 9. Lender Forbearance and Ex Ante Explicit Contracting 
This table presents borrower-(loan)package-quarter level fixed effects regression estimates of VIOLATION, an indicator 
that equals one if the borrower discloses a material covenant violation in an SEC filing, and zero otherwise, on 
NEGATIVE_SLACK, an indicator that equals one if the borrower is in breach of at least one covenant threshold, and 
zero otherwise, interacted with EX_ANTE_STRICT, an indicator that equals one if the loan has an ex ante strict 
(i.e., above median) covenant package, and zero otherwise, and control variables. Columns (1) and (2) measure 
EX_ANTE_STRICT using the initial covenant slack of the covenant package, and columns (3) and (4) use the measure 
of initial contract strictness from Murfin (2012) for the sample of loans with more than two covenants. Data restrictions 
limit the sample in columns (3) and (4). The first quarter of each loan is excluded from the sample. Heteroskedasticity-
robust standard errors are clustered by borrower, and presented in parentheses. ***, **, and * denote results significant 
at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels. 
Dependent variable: VIOLATION      
  (1) (2)  (3) (4) 
NEGATIVE_SLACK 11.990*** 6.838***  10.113*** 5.110*** 
 (0.865) (0.740)  (0.960) (0.927) 
EX_ANTE_STRICT × NEGATIVE_SLACK -3.427*** -2.467**  -3.609** -2.509** 
 (1.214) (1.115)  (1.335) (1.245) 
      
Slack control:      
  Polynomial order Linear Linear  Linear Linear 
  Bandwidth Global Global  Global Global 
Fixed Effects:      
_Industry × Year-quarter Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
_Lender × Borrower No Yes  No Yes 
R2 0.1313 0.3449  0.1596 0.3551 
Obs. 90,900 90,832  61,402 61,362 
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Table 10. Lender Forbearance and Reputation 
This table presents borrower-(loan)package-quarter level fixed effects regression estimates of VIOLATION, an indicator 
that equals one if the borrower discloses a material covenant violation in an SEC filing, and zero otherwise, on 
NEGATIVE_SLACK, an indicator that equals one if the borrower is in breach of at least one covenant threshold, and 
zero otherwise, interacted with proxies for lead arranger reputation and control variables. Columns (1) and (2) interact 
NEGATIVE_SLACK with TOP_10, an indicator that equals one if the lead arranger is among the top ten ranked 
underwriters by deal volume in the quarter, and zero otherwise. Columns (3) and (4) interact NEGATIVE_SLACK 
with lnLEAGUE_RANK the natural log of the lead arranger’s rank by deal volume in the quarter. Heteroskedasticity-
robust standard errors are clustered by borrower, and presented in parentheses. ***, **, and * denote results significant 
at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels. 
Dependent variable: VIOLATION      
  (1) (2)  (3) (4) 
NEGATIVE_SLACK 10.635*** 6.339***  6.529*** 3.133*** 
 (0.727) (0.658)  (1.236) (1.117) 
TOP_10 × NEGATIVE_SLACK -2.526*** -1.404*    
 (0.965) (0.804)    
lnLEAGUE_RANK × NEGATIVE_SLACK    1.037*** 0.873*** 
    (0.367) (0.327) 
      
Slack control:      
  Polynomial order Linear Linear  Linear Linear 
  Bandwidth Global Global  Global Global 
Fixed Effects:      
_Industry × Year-quarter Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
_Lender × Borrower No Yes  No Yes 
R2 0.1232 0.3272  0.1233 0.3273 
Obs. 99,573 99,516  99,573 99,516 
 
 
  
77 
 
Table 11. Lender Forbearance and Enforcement Outcomes 
Columns (1) and (3) of this table presents borrower-(loan)package-quarter level regression estimates of FEE, an 
indicator that equals one if the borrower discloses fee payment in an 8-K filing, and zero otherwise, and AMENDMENT, 
an indicator that equals one if the borrower’s loan is renegotiated, and zero otherwise, on VIOLATION, an indicator 
that equals one if the borrower discloses a material covenant violation in an SEC filing, and zero otherwise, and control 
variables for observations in which the borrower is in breach of at least one covenant threshold. Columns (2) and (4) 
of this table present fuzzy regression discontinuity design estimates of FEE and AMENDMENT, respectively, on 
VIOLATION. The relevant first stage results for these specifications are presented in column (3) of Table 2. 
Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors are clustered by borrower, and presented in parentheses. ***, **, and * denote 
results significant at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels. 
Dependent variable:  FEE  AMENDMENT 
 OLS  Fuzzy RD  OLS  Fuzzy RD 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
VIOLATION 2.188***  9.997***  6.618***  44.012*** 
 (0.373)  (1.519)  (1.092)  (6.267) 
        
Slack control:        
  Polynomial order Linear  Linear  Linear  Linear 
  Bandwidth Global  Global  Global  Global 
Fixed Effects:        
_Industry × Year-quarter Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
FFirst Stage   3,235.49    3,235.49 
R2 0.1310    0.0992   
Obs. 99,573  99,573  99,573  99,573 
 
 
 
 
 
